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Abstract 
Background  
Research suggests that children are only able to flexibly apply more than 
one label (e.g. mouse and animal) in one situation with one conversational 
partner after they pass standard false belief tasks. Both abilities have been 
attributed to the understanding of perspective 
Aim 
The aim of the studies was to extend previous research to examine the 
disambiguation effect, children’s tendency to select an unfamiliar object in the 
presence of another but familiar object as referent for a novel word. Theoretical 
considerations suggest this effect initially results from a lack of understanding 
perspective. 
Method 
Five studies were conducted in Scotland and Austria, involving 243 
children between the ages of 2.5 and 6.5. Studies 1 to 3 compared the standard 
disambiguation task with a task in which a strong pragmatic cue indicates the 
familiar object is the correct referent. Performances on these tasks were 
compared with performances on the false belief task, the alternative naming 
task, as well as tests of executive functioning. Studies 4 and 5 extended these 
methods to examine bilingual children’s metacognitive abilities in relation to 
word learning. 
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Results 
Children become able to suspend the disambiguation effect when 
presented with strong pragmatic cues at the same time as they pass false belief 
and alternative naming tasks (Experiment 1). This can neither be attributed to 
impulsivity or the ability to inhibit a response, nor order effects of pragmatic 
cues and novel words (Experiment 2). Children’s ability to apply two labels to 
one object in a correction task also related to their perspectival understanding. 
Previous findings that suggested that younger children could produce multiple 
labels in a misnaming paradigm were not replicated (Experiment 3 a, b). The 
developmental change in children’s metalinguistic behaviour was demonstrated 
to follow the same trajectory in monolinguals, bilinguals and children exposed to 
another language (Experiment 4 and 5). Bilinguals show a marginally better 
ability to recall novel foreign language labels.  
Conclusion 
The disambiguation effect is the result of cognitive immaturity in young 
children. Older children show a change in behaviour at the same time as they 
present more metacognitive maturity. Common development with theory of 
mind and metalinguistic abilities is attributed to an understanding of 
perspective.  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Introduction 
The following thesis addressed the relationship between 
metarepresentation and word learning. Children between the ages of 3 to 5 
were of special interest as changes in metarepresentational abilities have been 
observed at this time in development. The studies presented investigated 
possible changes in metalinguistic development to address if these occur at the 
same time. The mutual exclusivity bias, a proposed word learning 
phenomenon, was examined. Two different theoretical accounts, namely lexical 
principles and sociopragmatic approach, and their explanation around mutual 
exclusivity were analysed. The perspectival account of metacognition was 
applied to children’s word learning. Based on this account, it was suggested 
that mutual exclusivity is firstly due to conceptual immaturity, of which any word 
learning benefits are an incidental consequence. The immaturity is overcome 
once children gain a level of metacognitive understanding which is indicated by 
passing false belief tasks. Later observations of mutual exclusivity behaviour 
can be explained by logical reasoning.  
 The second part of the thesis investigated bilingual children’s 
metarepresentational and metalinguistic development. Previous research 
around bilingual theory of mind and the disambiguation effect was presented. 
Possible advantages bilingual children might have due to constant exposure to 
multiple labelling were addressed.  
The conclusion was that the disambiguation effect in young children is 
the result of cognitive immaturity which restricts children from considering 
multiple labels for one object, even when given strong pragmatic cues to do so. 
Once children understand perspective they are able to accept two labels for 
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one object, when there are pragmatic cues to this being appropriate. This ability 
is demonstrated by their performance on the pragmatic cue (PC) task. 
The findings were well supported by the perspectival account’s 
predictions and account for word learning phenomena between the age of 3 
and 4 for monolingual and bilingual children equally.  
 
Metarepresentation and theory of mind. 
Metarepresentations were defined as “The process of ˊrepresenting the 
representational relation itselfˋ (Pylyshyn, 1978), or representing a 
representation as a representation (Perner, 1991).” (Doherty, 2009, p. 214). 
A representation can take the form of a statement or a thought about 
something or a picture of something. A metarepresentation is then, for example, 
a statement about a statement, a thought about a thought or a picture of a 
picture. Metarepresentation is most commonly discussed in the context of 
theory of mind as the critical ability required to pass the standard false belief 
task. In relation to this it is important to note that representations include not 
only mental but also public representations (like utterances, pictures, etc.) 
(Sperber, 2001). Hence, the mature ability to metarepresent includes both 
understanding of thoughts and understanding of non-mental representations 
such as language. The thesis extended this comparison. 
The term “theory of mind” was first discussed in connection with 
research of chimpanzees and the question whether this species reasons over 
other’s differing beliefs, thoughts and desires (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This 
lead to the investigation of theory of mind in developmental psychology and to 
the false belief task which assess children’s understanding of other’s mental 
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states. The original version for children by Wimmer and Perner (1983) has been 
adapted many times; Translated from the German original, a story is acted out 
with several toys as follows:  
Maxi has a chocolate bar. He puts his chocolate bar in the kitchen 
cupboard and leaves the kitchen to go and play. His mother comes into the 
kitchen. She needs some chocolate for baking. She takes Maxi’s chocolate bar 
from the cupboard and puts it into the drawer after she has finished baking. She 
then leaves the kitchen and Maxi comes back for his chocolate bar. - Children 
are then asked: “Where will Maxi look first for his chocolate?” (after Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983).  
Children need to understand that Maxi’s mental state or belief about the 
location of the chocolate bar differs from reality to pass the false belief task and 
answer the question correctly. While Maxi thinks the chocolate is in the 
cupboard, he is misrepresenting the location of the chocolate. When children 
are able to recognise that Maxi can have a belief that differs from reality, they 
display metarepresentational understanding. They understand that other’s 
thoughts or representations can be seen as that and evaluated against reality. 
Children around the age of four years seem to be able to do this and pass the 
false belief task, predicting belief based behaviour correctly. Hence, the ability 
to represent someone else’s belief in one’s own mind and make belief based 
judgements require metarepresentational skills. 
Metalinguistic awareness on the other hand indicates the understanding 
of language as a carrier of meaning (Doherty & Perner, 1998). As reviewed in 
Doherty (2009) there are traditionally two different hypotheses regarding the 
development of metalinguistic awareness. The interaction hypothesis assigns 
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an initial awareness of language as a carrier of meaning to children (e.g., Clark, 
1978). Children need this awareness to learn to speak and develop it further 
while growing their understanding of language. The autonomy hypothesis 
declares that children do not need an understanding of language when they 
start to speak (e.g., Gombert, 1990/1992). Metalinguistic awareness develops 
later, around the age of five to seven. 
Doherty (2009) pointed out that most definitions combine conceptual 
understanding of language as a carrier of meaning and the executive 
functioning required to exercise this understanding. According to Doherty 
(2009, p. 82): “The fundamental difference between theory of mind and 
metalinguistic awareness may be only in the domain of application: language or 
mind”. The traditional false belief task assesses the understanding of the 
representational character of mental states. In the unexpected-transfer task, the 
understanding that the protagonist’s belief misrepresents reality is necessary. 
Assessing Doherty’s claim requires a task that assesses the understanding of 
the representational character of words.  
Doherty and Perner (1998) investigated the connection between 
metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind. Both metalinguistic and 
metarepresentational awareness might follow the same developmental pattern 
and be due to a common conceptual change. The authors turned to the use of 
synonyms in the search of a task examining linguistic metarepresentation in 
children. Two different names for one object like “bunny” and “rabbit” can refer 
to the same thing. Being aware that two different labels can be applied to 
represent the same referent indicates metalinguistic awareness. Doherty and 
Perner (1998) presented three to five year old children with a synonym 
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judgement task. Children were told two names for a picture (for example mug 
and cup) and then asked to choose one. A puppet was then asked to say the 
other name for it then and children had to judge whether puppet was correct. 
Children’s ability to correctly judge puppet’s performance strongly correlated 
with their ability to pass a standard false belief task. In their second study, 
children were asked to produce a second name for the picture, which was also 
strongly associated with false belief understanding. This was seen as indication 
for metalinguistic abilities, indicated by the understanding that two labels can 
represent one referent, and metarepresentational ability, indicated by the 
understanding that different beliefs can represent and misrepresent reality at 
the same time, to be grounded in a shared conceptual understanding.  
These findings were later extended with categorical labels (e.g. rabbit & 
animal; Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002). Children performed a 
similar task, but had to produce and judge puppet’s production of alternative 
names for a referent. Results were similarly to the synonym tasks. Children 
were able to produce alternative names at the same time in development as 
they were able to pass false belief. Categorical labels do not share the same 
meaning in the way synonyms do, though. The application of 
metarepresentation in this example needed to be revised. 
 
Perspectival understanding. 
Perner (2000) explained this as an understanding of perspective 
necessary in both theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness. Perspective is 
a property of representation. Every representation of an object represents the 
object in a specific way. Different representations of the same object always 
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differ in the perspective on that object. The easiest explanation comes from 
visual perspectives. Whether an object is seen from the front or the back 
depends on the point of view. Different places afford different points of view. 
Hence, many different perspectives are possible on the same object in one 
moment in time. The representational understanding of the mind became a 
perspectival understanding of the mind. 
In the false belief task, both protagonists have different beliefs about the 
location of the chocolate bar or different perspectives on looking at reality. The 
shift from metarepresentational to perspectival understanding was therefore 
applicable here. The understanding of perspective is also relevant to the 
understanding of naming. Psycholinguists claim that different labels for a 
referent always differ in perspective (Clark, 1987; Tomasello, 1999).  
This is evident when categorical labels are considered. If a referent is, 
for example, labelled as a mouse, the label restricts the possible judgements 
which can be made. It could possibly be described as “big” compared to other 
mice. Applying the label “animal” and comparing it to other animals, it is still 
quite small. So the mouse/animal is big or small depending on which label is 
chosen, which perspective is taken (Doherty & Perner, 2013). The 
understanding of alternative naming therefore requires the understanding of 
perspective. 
Perner (2000) explains how children develop from taking a perspective 
to switching a perspective and finally to understanding perspective. The first 
step is simply having a mental state - representing something in thought, 
utterance or other way. The next step is switching between perspectives, 
starting by being externally induced. Studies by Flavell and colleagues 
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described this ability clearly (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981). Children 
between the age of three and five were shown a picture of a turtle by the 
experimenter, who sat opposite the child. Children were able to switch between 
two perspectives when the picture was displayed facing them correctly or 
upside down. They answered accordingly, whether the turtle was on his feet or 
on his back. Only the older children were able to express what the experimenter 
saw. The ability to switch displayed by younger children is externally driven. 
The experimenter turns the picture and children switch their representations. 
Older children have control over the ability to switch, they understand 
perspectival differences. Hence, they can express what the experimenter sees 
and what they see at the same time.  
The perspectival account is therefore able to explain developmental 
change presented by passing false belief and alternative naming. Children 
show a difficulty producing two familiar labels for one referent until they 
understand perspective. A conceptually similar task to the alternative naming 
task, the disambiguation task looks at children’s tendency to avoid two labels 
for one referent. In the disambiguation task, children are presented with one 
familiar and one unfamiliar object and asked to choose a referent by a novel 
word. Children tend to select the novel item, showing a reluctance to consider 
the novel word as an alternative label for the familiar object. Similarly to the 
alternative naming task, children avoid two labels for one object. They behave 
as if nouns were mutually exclusive.  
The question arises whether children also present a conceptual change 
when faced with the disambiguation task. Do younger children pick the novel 
object more often than older children? Is there a connection to perspectival 
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understanding? There should be at first glance, as both tasks seem to have 
similar demands. The alternative naming task requires the child to flexibly apply 
two labels to one object. The disambiguation task would also require the 
application of two labels to one object, if the child considers the familiar object 
as referent. However, the studies reviewed in the following do not show 
evidence of a developmental change around the age of four in disambiguation 
behaviour.  
There are two plausible reasons why this might be the case. On the one 
hand, this has simply not been looked at in general. On the other hand, 
choosing the novel item in the disambiguation task as referent is the more 
sensible choice if no other information is displayed. Adults faced with the same 
task would choose the same way. Following the perspectival account, mutual 
exclusivity can be interpreted as metacognitive immaturity in children. Young 
children select the novel object, as they cannot accept a second label for an 
already named object, similarly to their behaviour in the alternative naming task. 
Older children and adults choose the novel object, as they assess the 
information provided and select the sensible referent. The result is the same. 
The cognitive path towards it is different. Mutual exclusivity might be a 
conceptual difficulty expressed by young children during word learning.  
 
Further word learning theories. 
Other theoretical accounts aim to explain mutual exclusivity assumptions 
differently. Supporters of the lexical principles approach describe the mutual 
exclusivity bias as integral to children’s word learning (e.g., Markman & 
Wachtel, 1988; Merriman & Bowman, 1989). Children’s assumption that word 
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meaning cannot overlap is supposed to limit possible referents for a novel word 
and so benefit word learning. The mutual exclusivity bias has been 
hypothesized to be one of several lexical principles children employ in word 
learning (Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994; Merriman & Bowman, 1989).  
Markman and Wachtel (1988) presented a series of studies around the 
mutual exclusivity bias. Children between the age of three and four tended to 
select the novel item as referent for the novel word at ceiling level in the 
standard disambiguation task. When children were shown only familiar items 
and a novel word, they tended to ascribe the label to a part or the substance of 
the familiar item. When shown a novel item and a novel label, children tended 
to ascribe it to the whole object. This was again seen as support for the 
assumption that labels are mutually exclusive.  
Merriman and Bowman (1989) described several potential effects 
relating to mutual exclusivity. The disambiguation effect explained above is the 
most heavily researched. They further named the correction effect, which 
describes the removal of a familiar term in favour of a novel term for an item. 
The correction effect is the only other effect which has gained some attention in 
the research field (Savage & Au, 1996). A further effect, the rejection effect was 
defined as refusal to accept a novel term for an item. Merriman and Bowman 
(1989) stated that if a child is adhering to the mutual exclusivity bias, one of 
these three effects will be observed when new terms are introduced. The child 
will also always display a restriction effect: a new term cannot be generalized 
as additional label for an already named object. An object cannot have two 
overlapping terms. The authors explained different views on when the mutual 
exclusivity bias emerges: at the start of word learning, during early childhood or, 
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supported by opponents of the theory, never; Merriman and Bowman (1989) 
described the bias to develop throughout early childhood as a useful word 
learning heuristic. They argued, the bias would restrict infants in learning new 
words quickly if it would emerge with word learning and is of real use after 
some vocabulary has developed.  
Golinkoff et al. (1994) supported the idea of a general lexical 
development occurring first. They also argued that children are driven by a 
desire to map a novel term onto a nameless category (N3C principle) rather 
than the desire not to map a novel term on an already named category. 
Children might further employ principles more or less strongly depending on 
their memory processes and present individual differences in preferences for 
employing certain principles (Merriman & Lipko, 2008).  
 
Supporters of the sociopragmatic approach present an alternative view 
of children’s decision making in the disambiguation task. Here, children 
determine word meaning by interpreting speaker intention (Bloom, 2000; 
Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). Speakers around them give enough pragmatic 
information to enable children’s learning of novel words. The following 
principles are claimed to explain object choice in the disambiguation task:  
Clark’s Principle of Contrast: “whenever there is a difference in form of a 
language, there is a difference in meaning (Clark, 1987, p. 1) combined with the 
Principle of Conventionality: “For certain meanings, there is a conventional form 
that speakers expect to be used in the language community” (Clark, 1988, p. 
319)  
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Presented with an apple and a whisk and asked to point to the “hinkle”, a 
child might reason that if the speaker wanted to refer to the apple, she would 
have said “apple”, which is the conventional form. Because she said “hinkle”, 
she must mean something else, and the whisk is a sensible choice. Problematic 
is the use of term “meaning” instead of reference. Apple and “hinkle” differ in 
meaning but could still refer to the same object, similar to, for example, apple 
and fruit. Following the Principle of Conventionality, which speaks of meaning, 
this does not generally prohibit the selection of already labelled objects as 
referents in the disambiguation situation (Doherty & Perner, 2013). 
If conceptual changes can be observed in perspectival understanding 
around the age of four, changes might be observable around children’s 
apparent mutually exclusivity assumption. The similarities between alternative 
naming difficulties and mutual exclusivity would point towards this. The 
following presents previous findings around apparent mutual exclusivity 
assumptions across the age range. So far, the literature only contains one 
study showing an age related change while also implicitly pitting predictions of 
lexical principles and sociopragmatic cues against each other: Haryu (1991) is 
addressed in detail. 
 
Disambiguation studies addressing lexical principles explanations. 
Studies looking at the emergence of an apparent mutual exclusivity bias 
in development used a variety of set ups. One of the most frequent methods 
with infants is the preferential looking technique. Halberda (2003) presented 
infants between 14 and 17 months with sets of a familiar plus an unfamiliar 
picture. Children were then told to look at the “dax”. Results showed 14 month 
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old infants to look systematically at a familiar object when hearing a novel word. 
Infants at 16 months performed at chance level. Only from 17 months did 
infants systematically look at the novel object above baseline. The author 
concluded that infants learn words initially without a word learning strategy, as 
the results pointed towards stable mutual exclusivity bias only in the older age 
group. 
 Mather and Plunkett (2010) explained that the 10 month old children in 
their studies prefer the novelty of objects and labels, which acts as a precursor 
for the development of mutual exclusivity. They showed infants sets of familiar 
and novel objects and told them to look either at the familiar item or at a novel 
referent (“Look at the mido!”). Initially, infants did not show any looking 
preferences. After the third trial, infants looked significantly longer at the novel 
object in response to the novel label than in response to a familiar label. The 
authors concluded that infant’s interest in novel items was enhanced throughout 
the trials because of the novel labels. They mentioned that infants in their study 
probably did not know the familiar terms for all objects and could therefore not 
display a strict mutual exclusivity bias, which would exclude the familiar item as 
it is already named. Infants looked at the novel item in response to the novel 
word because of a preference for novelty. This was explained as initial step 
towards the development of mutual exclusivity. 
Another study supporting children’s preference for novelty when trying to 
map novel words presented 22 month old infants with sets of three items, one 
familiar and two novel (Mather & Plunkett, 2012). One of the novel items had 
previously been familiarized to the child, without labelling it. Children were then 
asked to look at the “dif”. The not familiarized novel item was looked at with 
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higher preference in response to the novel label. The authors suggested that 
children’s disambiguation was driven by the search for complete novelty after 
hearing a novel label. The preference for looking at the super-novel object upon 
hearing a novel label was therefore not driven by knowing a label for the other 
novel object. Also, hearing novel labels increased children’s preference for 
looking at novel-novel labels over the course of trials.  
A study with 18, 24 and 30 month olds found that the youngest group did 
not prefer novel objects as referents for novel words (Bion, Borovsky, & 
Fernald, 2012). Different to the studies presented before, 18 month old children 
disambiguated at chance level, the other two age groups displayed clear 
disambiguation. Children were then tested on retention of the novel word, 
presenting the familiarized novel next to an unfamiliar novel item. The oldest 
group performed just above chance, both younger groups looked randomly. It 
was concluded, that disambiguation is related to word learning, but not 
essential at the beginning. It develops and increases with growing vocabulary 
and lexical experience.  
In a slightly different set-up, with only a familiar object visible and a 
bucket as possible location for more objects, children between 15-17 and 18-20 
months resisted the familiar object when asked for a novel label and searched 
for another possible object (Markman, Wasow, & Hansen, 2003). The younger 
children searched even more for an alternative in a variation of the task where 
the bucket was removed and only the familiar object was in sight. The authors 
concluded that infants in their tasks applied mutual exclusivity. Without a novel 
object, children clearly demonstrated a reluctance to select the familiar item as 
referent for the novel word and not a tendency to fill lexical gaps, supporting the 
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existence of a mutual exclusivity bias. The authors further mentioned that 
reduced task demand might have enabled younger children to demonstrate 
their word learning strategies more clearly.  
Overall, most studies using the preferential looking paradigm agreed that 
infants show disambiguation around the age of 15 to 17 months. Studies with 
younger children found recognition of novelty but not in connection with word 
learning, rather displaying novelty-preference. Mutual exclusivity seems to 
afford some existing knowledge and novelty to bootstrap new meaning to new 
words (Mather, 2013).  
The preference for super-novelty was further investigated with two year 
olds (Horst, Samuelson, Kucker, & McMurray, 2011). Children were familiarized 
with novel objects and then presented with set-ups of two now-familiar and one 
super-novel item and asked to pick by a novel label. Children presented a clear 
preference for the super-novel item. A variation of the task identified that 
novelty to the child was more important than novelty to the experimenter. 
Children even selected the super-novel item more often, if all objects were 
equally novel to the experimenter asking for a novel label referent. This seems 
to clearly violate any suggestions of interpreting speaker intentions as 
presented by the sociopragmatic account. 
 Suanda and Namy (2013) added a new line of support to the lexical 
principles account. They presented children aged 18 months with standard 
disambiguation tasks using novel words and additionally tasks using novel 
gestures. In the gesture condition, a novel object was introduced accompanied 
by a novel gesture. Another novel object was presented without a gesture. The 
child was then asked to pick an object accompanied by a new gesture. Children 
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disambiguated clearly in the novel word task but performed around chance in 
the gesture disambiguation task. A second experiment ensured that children 
were mapping gestures onto objects. The child was asked to choose in the 
exact same situation, only now using the gesture or word introduced initially. 
Here, children selected the introduced referent on similar levels in both 
conditions. Therefore, children mapped gestures onto novel objects, but did not 
treat gestures as mutually exclusive. The authors argue that the two conditions 
require the same inferences about the other’s referential intentions. Thus the 
lack of disambiguation effect in the gesture condition suggests that the standard 
disambiguation effect is not a result of inferences about intention, but a lexical 
phenomenon. 
Jaswal (2010) also supported the view that children follow lexical 
principles to determine word meaning. Interpreting speaker intent is secondary 
and will overrule lexical principles only if pragmatic information is overwhelming. 
He presented children aged 2;6 with disambiguation tasks. Experimenters 
made either a neutral request (asking for “it”) or a request using a novel word 
combined with either pointing or gazing towards the familiar item. Children used 
the pragmatic information following the neutral request but not after the label 
request. In a follow up, the author combined pragmatic information cues: The 
experimenter pointed and gazed towards the familiar object while requesting an 
object using a novel label. Now children were using the pragmatic information 
to overcome the mutual exclusivity bias following the author’s interpretation.  
Studies around the lexical principle approach seem overall to agree that 
disambiguation occurs after some vocabulary has been acquired. It seems to 
be reliably shown from around 17 to 19 months. This may be artificially 
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reinforced by testing techniques and the problematic of finding the appropriate 
set-up for an age group.  
 
Disambiguation studies addressing sociopragmatic explanations. 
The sociopragmatic approach presented a variety of studies analysing 
the disambiguation effect. Children’s object choice is here promoted to be 
driven by quite advanced cognitive abilities to interpret speaker intention. 
Diesendruck and Markson (2001) found the disambiguation effect to occur not 
only with novel labels, but also with novel idiosyncratic facts. The authors 
offered three year old children sets of two novel objects and a novel fact about 
one of them (e.g., “My sister gave this to me”). Then children were asked to 
select the referent of a different novel fact for puppet (“the one my dog likes to 
play with”). Children were found to disambiguate in a similar way with fact 
references (4.4/6 trials) as with labels (4.9/6). The authors used this as 
argument against the disambiguation effect being the result of a specifically 
lexical principle, stating similar disambiguation levels should not be observed 
with facts, if the mutual exclusivity bias is a pure word learning principle.  
A further finding from the initial Diesendruck and Markson (2001) paper 
was the impact of speaker presence and absence. A puppet functioned as 
second experimenter and was absent when a novel label was introduced for 
one of two novel objects. The puppet then asked for an object upon return, 
using a different novel name. Children disambiguated strongly, on average 
4.9/6 cases. The same set-up was used again with novel facts. An additional 
condition was added with puppet present when the experimenter introduced a 
novel fact to compare the influence of shared and unshared novel knowledge. 
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Children disambiguated slightly less in the condition with puppet present than in 
the initial study mentioned before, but on average 3.9/6 times. When puppet 
was absent throughout the introduction, children performed at chance level. 
This was seen as support for the sociopragmatic explanation, as children make 
judgements based on shared and unshared knowledge. Puppet has not heard 
the fact about the object when he asks for something using a different fact. He 
could want either of the objects. But puppet is expected to know the proper 
labels for objects, hence disambiguation in the first case mentioned.  
Diesendruck (2005) extended the investigation into presence and 
absence of the second experimenter. He introduced the comparison of common 
(“a teega”) and proper (“Meloo”) nouns. When puppet was present while the 
experimenter named one picture of an unknown creature, there was no 
difference between common and proper nouns. Children disambiguated equally 
(3.0 & 2.7/3). When puppet was absent, children disambiguated to the same 
level (2.9/3) only when introduced to a common noun, not to a proper noun. 
Here, they performed at chance. Again, no interaction with age was analysed. 
Hence, children appeared to take speakers’ knowledge into account when 
disambiguating novel words at three and four years of age. 
Children’s ability to disambiguate novel terms for parts of an object was 
also subject to investigation (Saylor, Sabbagh, & Baldwin, 2002). The authors 
argued that teaching in a more naturalistic way would include referring to the 
object by its familiar label and then asking for a part by a novel label. This set 
up proved to be the most successful for three and four year old children in 
identifying the referent. If the experimenter asked, for example “See this 
butterfly? What colour is the thorax?” Children were able to disambiguate the 
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new label thorax significantly more often than when the butterfly was labelled as 
“thing” or not at all. In a variation, the authors replaced the initial labelling with 
gestures or ambiguous pointing. Children disambiguated the novel part label 
significantly less in these conditions. This showed children using referential 
gesture to disambiguate novel words equally, when gestures were salient 
enough to provide reference. The authors concluded that children’s ability to 
read speaker intention is fundamental to word learning. 
The disambiguation paradigm was further employed with younger 
children in many variations. Grassmann, Stracke and Tomasello (2009) 
presented two-year-olds with a novel object and an experimenter looking at the 
object while excitedly announcing a novel word. If children had not seen the 
experimenter with the object before, they interpreted the novel word as 
reference for the object through object-directed actions. If they had seen the 
experimenter play with the object before, children searched for another referent. 
This was interpreted as children being aware that the experimenter would not 
show this much excitement towards a familiar object. The object would be “old 
news” and not provoke an enthusiastic response.  
Grassman and Tomasello (2010) investigated how much pragmatic 
information like pointing would add to children’s object choice. They presented 
two and four year olds with a standard disambiguation task. The experimenter 
then asked for a “modi” while pointing to the familiar item. Children followed the 
pointing over the lexical information, when the experimenter also gazed in the 
pointed direction. Different to Jaswal (2010), pointing without gaze resulted in 
choice at chance level.. When the experimenter used familiar lexical information 
(asked, for example, for the car) but pointed to the novel object, children again 
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followed the pointing. Children chose randomly between following pragmatic or 
lexical information when the experimenter used a familiar word and pointed to a 
different familiar object. The authors concluded that in first instance children 
rely on pragmatic information like pointing to resolve ambiguity. 
Brand (2000) employed an experimental set up, using repeated labelling 
and eye gaze for 12, 19 and 24 month old infants. This included one interesting 
and one boring toy, with eye gaze either coinciding with the interesting toy or 
creating conflict by indicating the boring toy. The 12 month old children focused 
on the interesting toy regardless of any cueing provided. By 19 months, children 
looked at the boring toy when indicated through eye-gaze, but still focused the 
majority of time on the more salient toy. The 24 month old children were able to 
focus their attention in line with eye gaze of the experimenter on the target. In a 
variation of the task, the two objects swapped places before the test trial. Now 
only the 24 month old children recognised the target. The author argued, that 
word learning is best observed following the child’s interest. Then, even 12 
month old infants might show cue sensitivity and disambiguate accordingly. 
Children react therefore not strongly to speaker intention at the beginning of 
word learning, which would constrain their ability to acquire novel words at a 
young age. 
Children were repeatedly found to use some of the referential 
information provided by speaker and context. Problematic for the 
sociopragmatic account were findings by Scofield and Behrend (2007) who 
analysed age effects for label and fact disambiguation. They presented two, 
three and four-year olds with a set of two novel objects and introduced one of 
them by either a novel label or a novel fact. They then asked the children to 
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choose one object by either a novel label or another novel fact, hence four 
conditions: word/word, word/fact, fact/word, fact/fact. Children across the age 
groups disambiguated at similar levels for word probes (word/word: 41/49 
children, fact/word: 35/49). The fact probe was not different from chance 
(word/fact: 29/49, fact/fact: 25/49) and showed developmental changes. The 
two year olds performed below chance in these conditions, whereas the three- 
and four- year olds disambiguated to the same extent as with word probes. This 
was interpreted as direct conflict for the sociopragmatic account, which does 
not account for developmental change. Words and facts should be 
disambiguated to the same extent by two year olds as by three and four year 
olds, if children interpret speaker intention to determine word meaning.  
 
Autism and the theories. 
Children with autism have also been presented with the disambiguation 
paradigm. Their difficulties with social cues were assessed in relation to 
sociopragmatic word learning predictions. Children with autism have been 
shown to find it difficult to read social cues. Hence, reading speaker intention 
should be measurably harder for them, which puts the sociopragmatic theory to 
test.  
A group of children with autism and a group of toddlers, matched to their 
vocabulary, were presented with standard disambiguation tasks (Preissler & 
Carey, 2005). The children with autism performed extremely similarly to the 
younger toddler group. The authors then assessed children’s ability to judge 
referential content through eye gaze. Experimenter and child were both holding 
a novel object. The experimenter labelled one object and cued the referent with 
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eye gaze. Children were then asked to find the newly labelled target in a set of 
four objects. Toddlers performed correctly on the majority of cases. Children 
with autism were more likely to select the object they had held during the 
labelling phase. In comparison to their good ability to disambiguate novel words 
in the first study, children with autism seem to struggle to determine word 
meaning when reading speaker intention is necessary.  
A study with children and adolescents with autism (aged eight and 15) 
and typically developing matches compared performance on disambiguation 
situations when novel words and facts were included (de Marchena, Eigsti, 
Worek, Ono, & Snedeker, 2011). Participants were presented with standard 
disambiguation tasks, including two novel objects and two novel labels. In a 
variation, the first object was only described with an idiosyncratic fact (“My 
uncle gave this to me”). Then a request was made, using a different fact (“Give 
me the one my dog likes to play with”). Participants disambiguated clearly in 
both conditions (similar to Scofield and Behrend’s (2007) three and four year 
olds). The effect with facts was less strong, but significantly different from 
chance and did not differ between participants with ASD and their typically 
developing counterparts. This would speak against mutual exclusivity being a 
lexical principle, as disambiguation with facts would not guide word learning. 
However, the authors were able to present, that word and fact disambiguation 
were not related. Word disambiguation related strongly to receptive vocabulary 
size, which supports the idea as a word learning heuristic. Fact disambiguation 
did relate to communicative skills, which in turn did not relate to word 
disambiguation. Facts seem therefore to afford pragmatic interpretation abilities 
and the underlying mechanisms described here could be independent.  
27 
 
Overall, the studies supporting a sociopragmatic approach to word 
learning focus heavily on reading additional cues like pointing or eye gaze in 
disambiguation situations. Age related behavioural change was presented, 
strongly connected to children’s general development and their abilities to 
follow task demands. The sociopragmatic account can not explain why fact and 
word disambiguation are unrelated. Both clearly exert speaker intention to 
resolve ambiguity. The lexical principles account has difficulties explaining why 
developmental tendencies are observed in the application of mutual exclusivity. 
If the bias is applied to benefit word learning, it should also not be observed in 
at least similar form with facts and gestures unless this proves to be unrelated.  
 
Introducing a direct test of the predictions.  
Haryu (1991; Haryu & Imai, 1999) presented a direct test of the 
predictions of the lexical principles and socio-pragmatic accounts. She 
presented 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5 year old Japanese children with a classic 
disambiguation paradigm, for example involving one familiar object (e.g., an 
apple) and one unfamiliar object (a lipstick case). Children were then instructed 
to hand a puppet one of the objects using a novel term (word only condition). In 
another condition (word + pragmatic context condition), children were 
additionally given a strong pragmatic cue indicating that the puppet desired the 
familiar object: “Mary is hungry. I would like to give Mary (the) heku”. The word-
only-condition replicated previous findings. Children selected the unfamiliar 
object as referent for the novel term. No change was observed between the age 
groups. The other condition presented a very different picture, a clear 
developmental shift in object choice: 3.5-year-olds picked the novel object and 
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disregarded the pragmatic cue; 5.5-year-olds selected the familiar object as 
referent for the novel word and did not demonstrate a mutual exclusivity bias.  
 
The sociopragmatic account cannot explain this developmental shift. The 
speaker clearly vocalises his desire, the intention should be easily read. The 
puppet is for example “hungry” and there is only one edible item in the set of 
two. However, children overlooked the pragmatic cue in the second condition 
until about 4.5 years of age. A control condition ensured that 3.5 year olds were 
able to understand the pragmatic information in general. Here, children were 
told the puppet was hungry and asked to pick an object puppet might want. The 
3.5 year olds had no problems selecting the familiar object then. The 
developmental shift in the pragmatic condition was explained with growing 
experience in word learning. Children were assumed to adhere to the mutual 
exclusivity bias firstly. With increasing vocabulary and general knowledge they 
would be able to overcome the bias and consider for example the pragmatic 
information in this study to determine word meaning. This explanation can be 
accommodated by the lexical principles approach. It is difficult to see, though, 
how the acceptance of pragmatic information in Haryu’s study follows such a 
distinct developmental pattern.  
A more likely explanation for the timing of the developmental shift in 
Haryu’s (1991) study may come from the comparable studies with known words 
described before. In the alternative naming task, children were shown a picture 
and asked to provide a different label to a puppet (Doherty & Perner, 1998). 
The task is therefore similar to the disambiguation task except that all labels 
were familiar. Children are asked to produce the second familiar label in the 
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one and accept a second unfamiliar label in the other task. Children in the 
alternative naming task were unable to produce alternatives until the age of 
about four. This strongly correlated with the ability to pass a false belief task. 
Doherty and Perner (1998) argued both tasks need children to make a 
distinction between the object or situation and how it is thought or talked about. 
Perner, et al. (2002) characterize this in terms of an understanding of 
perspective. Understanding that two known words can apply to one object is 
conceptually similarly to understanding that a known and a novel word can both 
apply to one object. The latter understanding is required to pass Haryu’s 
pragmatic condition.  
The child was presented with a familiar item (apple) and an unfamiliar 
item (lipstick holder). Asked for a “hinkle”, the lipstick holder is the sensible 
choice. Asked to pick an item for the hungry puppet, the apple is the sensible 
choice. The combination of “hinkle” and “hungry” presents the child with a 
dilemma. The apple has already a label, the lipstick holder has not. But taking 
pragmatic information supplied by the speaker into consideration requires the 
selection of an edible item. This means, the new label has to be attached to the 
apple. The child needs to be able to accept two labels for one object.  
The sociopragmatic account should predict all children to be able to 
select the apple as referent for the hinkle. Speaker intention is obvious here. 
The lexical principles account would accept children can override mutual 
exclusivity in the face of clear pragmatic information but makes no predictions 
about the developmental pattern Haryu found in her study. The perspectival 
account predicts young children should be unable to consider the pragmatic 
cue. Children should be able to take the additional information into account at 
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the same time as they become able to pass false belief and alternative naming. 
They should be able to pass a new pragmatic cue task as they reach a level of 
metacognitive maturity, indicted by theory of mind. – These predictions were 
addressed in the following studies. 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 88 children (44 girls) from predominantly middle-class 
nurseries in central Scotland: 43 children took the standard disambiguation task 
(mean age 43 months, range = 31 - 59 m, SD = 7 m); 45 children took the 
pragmatic cue task (mean age 45 months, range = 34 - 60 m, SD = 7 m). 
Children’s verbal understanding was measured by the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale II (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997), a standard 
measure of verbal mental age, and did not differ between groups 
(disambiguation group: mean age 41 months, range = 29 – 59, SD = 7; 
pragmatic cue group: mean age 44 months, range = 20 – 84, SD = 12; t = -
1.25, df = 86, p = .215, d = -.27). 
 
Design. 
The false belief task, the alternative naming task, and either the 
disambiguation task or the pragmatic cue task were administered over two 
sessions in randomized order. The BPVS II was administered last. 
 
Procedure and Materials. 
Disambiguation task and pragmatic cue task. 
The child was introduced to Jimmy the puppet, then presented with a 
familiar object (e.g., a banana) and an unfamiliar object (e.g., a bottle stopper). 
Children were asked to choose an object, using a novel word. 
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Disambiguation condition:  
“Jimmy would like a hinkle, please give Jimmy a hinkle.” 
Pragmatic cue condition:  
“Jimmy is hungry and would like a hinkle, please give Jimmy a hinkle.”  
The objects, novel words, and pragmatic cues for all five trials are listed 
in Appendix A. 
 
False belief task. 
The child was introduced to two Playmobile® figures, a box, a jar and a 
marble and the following story was acted out: 
“Now look, this is Sally and this is Tom. They have a box and a jar. Sally 
has a green marble. Sally puts her marble in the box and then she goes away. 
Now, Tom picks up Sally’s marble from the box and puts it in the jar. Then Tom 
goes away. Look, Sally is coming back.” 
Each child was then asked the following three questions in order: 
Belief question: Where will Sally look first for her marble? 
Reality question: Where is the marble really?  
Memory question: Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning? 
Children had to answer all three questions correctly to pass the task. 
 
Alternative naming task. 
Vocabulary check. 
Four sheets of paper were presented individually, each displaying six 
pictures. Children had to point to each experimental item twice on different 
sheets, once under the basic label (e.g., “Show me the cat”) and once under 
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the superordinate label (“Show me the animal”). The correct item was pointed 
out to the child if the child refused to make a choice or pointed to the wrong 
picture. 
Alternative naming phase. 
Children were presented with an individual picture and told: 
“Now, here are some more pictures. Each picture has two names. I am going to 
tell you one name for it and you can then tell me another name for it. Let’s try 
that. This is fruit. What else is it?” If the child did not respond, encouragement 
was given. “We can also call it an apple.”  
After this practice trial, the procedure continued with four pictures (cat, 
food, owl, drink), then a second time using the alternative label (animal, burger, 
bird, milk). Children had to provide both superordinate and basic label to pass a 
particular trial.  
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Results 1 
 
Figure 1. Performance on disambiguation and pragmatic cue task 
 
Disambiguation and pragmatic cue task. 
Figure 1 shows the number of times children chose the familiar item. For 
the disambiguation task, most children chose the unfamiliar object on every 
trial; the most frequent response for the pragmatic cue task was to choose the 
familiar object on every trial, a highly significant difference: t = 9.87, df = 86, p < 
.001, d = 2.13. To compare performance, children were counted as passing 
each task if they chose the novel object (disambiguation task) or familiar object 
(pragmatic cue task) on 4 or more of 5 trials. Using these criteria, 81% of 
children passed the disambiguation task but only 53% passed the pragmatic 
cue task. 
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False belief task. 
About half the children passed the false belief task in each group: 
disambiguation group 49%, pragmatic cue group 53%, t = 0.79, df = 86, p = 
.430, d = 0.17.  
 
Alternative naming task. 
Mean performance on the vocabulary check was 7.4 out of 8 items (SD = 
0.70), indicating that failures on the ANT were not due to lack of relevant 
vocabulary. Setting a passing criterion of 2 out of 4 pairs, 40% of children in the 
disambiguation group and 47% of children in the pragmatic cue group passed 
the alternative naming task, a non-significant difference (t = 1.33, df = 86, p = 
.189, d = 0.29).   
Most failures on the ANT resulted from inability to provide superordinate 
labels. The 38 children who passed the task produced 3.45 basic labels and 
2.89 superordinate labels. The 50 children who failed the task produced a mean 
3.04 out of 4 basic labels and 0.2 superordinate labels; 81% of superordinate 
labels children failed to provide were in their receptive vocabulary. 
Twenty-one percent of responses were unanticipated but valid, such as 
“sandwich” instead of “burger” and “pussycat” instead of “cat”. The analysis 
presented below leniently scored such responses as correct. A separate 
analysis conducted using strict criteria produced the same overall pattern of 
results. 
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Comparison of tasks. 
Associations between task performances were examined separately for 
the disambiguation and pragmatic cue groups. Performance on the 
disambiguation task approached ceiling and was not significantly associated 
with other variables. Age and verbal mental age correlate strongly with 
performance on the false belief and the alternative naming task for this group 
(Table 1). No correlation was found between the disambiguation task and age, 
verbal mental age or FB and AN. The correlation between FB and AN remained 
stable after the influence of age and verbal mental age was accounted for. 
Table 1 Correlations between tasks for disambiguation group (partial correlation 
after partialling out age and VMA) 
 VMA False belief 
Alternative 
naming 
Disambiguation 
Age .53** .62** .43* .26 
VMA  .56** .40* -.05 
False belief   .63** (.47*) .09 (-.02) 
Alternative 
naming 
   -.03 (-.11) 
* p ˂. 01,   ** p < .001 
Children in the disambiguation group who passed the false belief task 
were also likely to pass both of the other tasks. Children who failed false belief 
were also likely to fail AN, but not DT. A binomial test demonstrated that 
children found the disambiguation task significantly easier than the false belief 
task (p = .004) and the alternative naming task (p < .001). The false belief task 
and the alternative naming task were not significantly different (p=.344). Hence 
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there was no indication of a connection between performance on false belief 
and the disambiguation task.  
The disambiguation and pragmatic cue groups performed virtually 
indistinguishable on all tasks apart from DT and PC, so the pragmatic cue 
group analysis is presented in greater detail. 
 
Table 2 Correlations between tasks for pragmatic cue group (partial correlation 
after partialling out age and VMA) 
 VMA False belief 
Alternative 
naming 
Pragmatic 
cue 
Age .75** .46** .55** .41* 
VMA  .54** .60** .52** 
False belief   .68** (.52**) .65** (.51**) 
Alternative 
naming 
   .68** (.53**) 
*p < .01,   **p < .001 
 
Performances on the false belief, alternative naming and pragmatic cue 
tasks were significantly intercorrelated (Table 2) and remained substantial and 
significant after age and VMA were partialled out (in parentheses) . 
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Figure 2 Percentage of children passing the false belief and alternative naming 
tasks according to performance on the pragmatic cue task  
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of children who passed the false belief 
and alternative naming tasks according to whether they passed or failed the 
pragmatic cue task. Most children who passed the pragmatic cue task passed 
the false belief and the alternative naming task; few children who failed the 
pragmatic cue task passed either of the other tasks. There were no significant 
performance differences between individual tasks (binomial test: pragmatic cue 
versus false belief task, p = 1.00, pragmatic cue versus alternative naming task, 
p = .453, false belief versus alternative naming, p = .549). 
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Discussion 1 
The clear difference in performance between the disambiguation task 
and the pragmatic cue task lead to the following interpretation. The 
disambiguation group did not receive a pragmatic cue and performed as if 
following a mutual exclusivity bias. Children’s performance on the 
disambiguation task did not change with age or metarepresentational 
awareness. No association between disambiguation and alternative naming 
was apparent. Children made a logical choice by selecting the novel object as 
referent for the novel label. With no other information provided, this seems 
reasonable. The pragmatic cue group on the other hand showed a pattern of 
results depending on the children’s ability to pass false belief. Children who 
were able to use the pragmatic cue to direct object choice were also able to 
predict behaviour in the false belief task and produce basic and superordinate 
labels in the alternative naming task. This difference in combination with the 
observation that all three tasks (PC, FB, AN) correlate well for the second group 
(Table 2), but only two of the tasks correlate for group 1 (FB, AN; Table 1) 
clearly indicates a connection between children’s ability to use pragmatic 
information and their metacognitive abilities.  
The pragmatic cue task seems therefore to measure metalinguistic 
abilities in a similar way to the alternative naming task. Where the latter 
requires children to flexibly apply two familiar labels to one object, the 
pragmatic cue task requires children to accept a second yet unknown label for a 
familiar object. Both tasks involve the understanding that more than one object 
label can be applied in one conversation with one conversational partner. The 
pragmatic cue task shows a clear change in children’s disambiguation of novel 
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words in the presence of additional information, contrary to the disambiguation 
task, which presents no change in behaviour. Disambiguation in the latter task 
remains constant as young children cannot conceive of an object having 
multiple labels in the given task. Older children make the same object choice 
because there is no additional pragmatic information to behave differently. This 
points to the mutual exclusivity bias being a developmental phenomenon. 
Younger children seem to disambiguate slightly less in the pragmatic cue task, 
though, which was investigated with a later study. 
One concern was that in the pragmatic cue task the cue (e.g. “Jimmy is 
hungry…”) is always stated before the novel word (“… and would like a hinkle”). 
Younger or more impulsive children might choose a referent based on the cue, 
without attending to the following word, producing false positives.  
A second experiment was therefore conducted with the order of mention 
of the cue and novel word reversed for half the participants. Additionally, an 
inhibition task was added to address the possible influence of inhibitory abilities 
on object selection. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. 
Twenty one children (9 girls; mean age = 47 months; range = 35 - 57; 
SD = 6 m) heard the pragmatic cue followed by the novel word; 23 children (11 
girls; mean age = 47 m; range = 40 - 59; SD = 6 m) heard the novel word 
followed by the pragmatic cue. 
 
Design. 
The design was as for Experiment 1, with the addition of the Day-Night 
Stroop task (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994) included either in the first or 
second session, counterbalanced. 
 
Procedure and Materials. 
Pragmatic cue task. 
There were two versions of the instructions: 
Cue + novel word:  
“Jimmy is very hungry and would really like a hinkle. Every time when he is 
hungry he likes a hinkle. Please give Jimmy a hinkle.” 
Novel word + cue:  
“Jimmy would really like a hinkle, because he is very hungry. He always likes a 
hinkle when he is hungry. Please give Jimmy a hinkle.” 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. Pictures of familiar and 
unfamiliar objects were used instead of real objects (Appendix B) to avoid 
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distractions caused by children manipulating the objects. This has been shown 
to produce the typical disambiguation effect (Diesendruck, 2005). 
 
Alternative naming task. 
To avoid unanticipated responses, cat/animal and burger/food were 
replaced by dog/animal and vegetable/carrot. Otherwise the procedure was as 
before. 
 
Day-Night Stroop. 
The child was presented with coloured sun pictures and black and white 
night sky pictures, and told to respond to the sun card by saying “night” and to 
the night card by saying “day.” After a brief training phase, children were 
presented one at a time with eight sun and eight moon cards randomly mixed. 
The criterion for passing the task was to correctly respond to five out of eight in 
each set.  
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Results 2 
Children in the cue + novel word condition chose the familiar object on 
3.0 out of 5 trials (SD = 1.3) compared to 2.7 out of 5 trials for children in the 
novel word + cue condition (SD = 1.2). This difference was not significant (t = 
.69, df = 42, p = .496, d = .22). The two groups performed virtually the same on 
all other tasks.  
 
Comparison of tasks. 
Correlations between the pragmatic cue, false belief and alternative 
naming tasks were similar to the first experiment, remaining substantial and 
significant after partialling out age and verbal mental age, and additionally the 
day-night Stroop (all partial r - values > .35, all p - values < .05). 
 
Table 3 Correlations between tasks (partial correlation after partialling out age, 
VMA and DNS) 
 BPVS False belief 
Alternative 
naming 
Pragmatic 
cue 
DNS 
Age .59*** .32* .46** .07 .35* 
BPVS 
Standardised 
Score 
 .51*** .46** .35* .38** 
False belief   .56*** (.43**) .52*** (.44**) .16 
Alternative 
naming 
   .40** (.35*) .15 
Pragmatic cue     .09 
* p ˂ .05,   ** p ˂ .01,   *** p < .001 
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Discussion 2 
The concern about children’s ability to inhibit responses was addressed 
with Experiment 2 in addition to possible order effects of pragmatic cue and 
novel word. The order of presenting the cue in the pragmatic cue task was not 
influential on children’s decision following the results. Even though this cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that children might react only on the cue, it 
ensures that children were listening to the full task instruction. The addition of 
the day-night Stroop task was able to address inhibitory abilities further. DNS 
related to age and verbal-mental age, but not to any of the metacognitive tasks 
presented. Even more, when the ability to inhibit was partialled out of the 
correlational analysis, the relationship between false belief and the two 
linguistic tasks stayed strong and significant. This confirms the results 
presented in Experiment 1. The pragmatic cue task shows strong connections 
to alternative naming and false belief.  
The first two studies demonstrate that children can select a familiar 
object as referent for a novel label in the presence of an unfamiliar object given 
information that this is appropriate around the same time as they become able 
to pass false belief tasks. Until then, children’s tendency to choose the novel 
object as referent of a novel label is remarkably strong. Even when they are 
told, before hearing the novel label, that Jimmy is hungry, younger children still 
subsequently choose the inedible novel object when asked to give Jimmy a 
hinkle. 
The ability to take the pragmatic cue into account is specifically related to 
the development of understanding of false belief, and of alternative naming. 
The relationship between these two metacognitive abilities has previously been 
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established, and has been attributed to the fact that both require a clear 
distinction between the object talked or thought about and how it is mentally or 
verbally represented (Doherty & Perner, 1998). Perner et al. (2002) refer to this 
distinction in terms of requiring a common understanding of perspective. This 
distinction also seems critical to success in the pragmatic cue task. Children 
need to be able to consider the novel label as new label for the familiar target. 
This requires the mental flexibility to consider multiple labels for one object, 
similar to the alternative naming task. The only difference is that the alternative 
naming task involves two familiar labels for one referent and the pragmatic cue 
task introduces a second label for one referent. Children who are able to 
consider the pragmatic cue for object choice present the metalinguistic ability to 
also produce alternative names for an object. Alternative labels for an object 
differ in perspective (Clark, 1987; Tomasello, 1999). Understanding perspective 
is therefore the key to passing the pragmatic cue task. 
Findings presenting some alternative naming abilities in the literature 
possibly challenge the presented alternative naming findings. Waxman and 
Hatch (1992) presented children with a misnaming task, asking them to teach 
“teddy” multiple names for a picture (e.g. rose, flower, plant). In order to elicit 
these responses, “teddy” misnamed the picture on each level (following the 
previous example: dandelion, tree, animal). They found 75% of the 3 year olds 
in their study to produce more than one label for a picture on at least 50% of the 
trials. This could contradict the assumptions of the perspectival account, 
considering the 3 year olds are most likely failing false belief. If these children 
are able to give a response and then select a different target label on a different 
level as next response while still keeping the former label in mind, they are 
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demonstrating perspectival understanding. This understanding has previously 
not been detected in children before they pass false belief. Experiment 3 a) was 
set up to address possible connections between the misnaming task, 
alternative naming and false belief. 
A further finding from the literature which was addressed in Experiment 3 
is the correction effect, which describes the removal of a familiar label in favour 
of a novel one. Next to the disambiguation effect, the correction effect is the 
only other proposed word-learning effect for which there is convincing evidence 
(Frank & Poulin-Dubois, 2002; Savage & Au, 1996) and should therefore be 
investigated in relation to the perspectival account.  
Savage and Au (1996) reported a study teaching children two new labels 
for one object (e.g. lemur/primate). One was introduced by the teacher, the 
other by the experimenter. Children were later asked to identify first all lemurs 
in a set of toys. After this sorting, they were asked to identify all primates (or all 
lemurs). Less than half of the 3 to 5 year olds accepted two labels for the 
object. The majority corrected one of the previously taught labels and 
persevered with the other one.  
Frank and Poulin-Dubois (2002) presented children with two 
experimenters referring to a novel object by two different novel labels. The 
authors investigated whether children would accept the overlap or choose an 
unnamed alternative when asked for the second label. Older children (mean = 
35 m) in their study displayed a stronger disambiguation effect. If the pragmatic 
cue task identifies children’s ability to take pragmatic information into account to 
connect novel words with familiar objects, an additional pragmatic cue in Frank 
and Poulin-Dubois task should do the same and direct children to a specific 
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target from the same age as they pass false belief. The ability to consider two 
novel labels for an object would therefore demonstrate the connection to 
perspectival understanding in another word learning situation. This hypothesis 
was addressed in Experiment 3a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Experiment 3a 
Method 
Participants. 
This study involved 38 children (18 girls) from local Nurseries in Salzburg 
(Austria) and was fully conducted in German.  Children were aged between 36 
and 79 months (mean = 53 months, SD = 11). Parents signed their children up 
through a consent form, confirming no history of language or hearing 
impairment and age-appropriate understanding of the German language. 
 
Design. 
Each child was seen individually in a small room next to the playgroup. 
The tasks were randomly split over the course of two days and included two 
false belief tasks, one on each day, the alternative naming task, pragmatic cue 
task, disambiguation task, a cued version of a task around the correction effect 
(extending a procedure used by Frank & Poulin-Dubois, 2002) and a 
misnaming task (after Waxman & Hatch, 1992). 
 
Procedure and Materials. 
The first false belief task was identical to Experiment 1 and was fully 
translated into German by a native speaker and reviewed by a second native 
speaker. 
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Alternative naming task. 
The carrot-vegetable pair was used as teaching item and a new item 
(water-drink) was added to the set-up to avoid two food pairs in the test set. 
The procedure was as in Experiment 2. 
 
Pragmatic cue task & disambiguation task. 
Both tasks were identical to Experiment 1 and 2 with one alteration to 
further improve the child’s focus on the novel word:  
The two pictures were presented to the child face down first. The child was then 
told that the puppet wanted (e.g.) a “Kulde”, and in the pragmatic cue task 
additionally informed that the puppet was very hungry (thirsty/cold/sleepy/sore). 
The child was then asked if she knew what a “Kulde” was and told there was a 
“Kulde” on one of the pictures. The pictures were then turned over and the child 
was asked to select the “Kulde”. The alteration was introduced to prevent 
children from reacting to the cue only and disregarding the novel label 
(materials: Appendix K & L). The tasks were also followed by a recall task 
immediately after. 
Recall. 
The child was presented with all five pictures she had selected in 
response during the pragmatic cue task and asked: “Which one is Jimmy’s 
hinkle?”, testing every novel word used before. Children were encouraged to 
point to an object for each of the novel words. 
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False belief 2. 
The child was presented with teddy “Sepperl” and told the following 
story: “This is Sepperl, he brought his lunchbox in today. Oh, look, he puts his 
keys in the lunch box to keep them safe. He wants to have a nap just now.” 
Teddy was then put in the bag, out of sight. The child was told teddy would be 
asleep by now and asked “Do you think Sepperl is having a nice nap?” in order 
to ensure the child assumed teddy would not listen to the following. “Now, I’m 
going to play a trick on Sepperl, I’m going to take his keys and hide them under 
my sheet.” The experimenter took the keys out of the box and placed them 
under the score sheet in front of her. She then looked into the bag. “Oh, I think 
Sepperl might be getting up now!” Teddy appeared again on the table and was 
placed between the box and the score sheet. The child was asked the following 
questions in order: 
Belief question: Where will Sepperl look first for his keys? 
Reality question: Where are the keys really?  
Memory question: Where did Sepperl put the keys in the beginning? 
Children had to answer all three questions correctly to pass the task. 
 
Correction task. 
The experimenter introduced the puppet “Freddy”, who was able to move 
his mouth and speak to the child. The puppet was therefore filling the purpose 
of a second experimenter (experimenter 2 in the following). The task consisted 
of a training and a test phase. Each training phase introduced four objects to 
the child, two familiar items such as small toys and two unfamiliar items. A full 
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list of all materials can be found in the appendix C. The task entailed four trials 
in set order.  
Training phase. 
Experimenter 1 handed an object to the child, stating “Look at this!”, and 
allowed the child to explore the object for up to 20s. When the child handed the 
object back, it was given to experimenter 2 to look at. Then the next object was 
introduced. The objects were ordered to introduce two familiar objects first, then 
two unfamiliar. If the child asked about object 3, which was unfamiliar, the 
experimenter explained she didn’t know what this one was, correcting the child 
if she tried to name it: “No, this is not an airplane. I don’t know what it’s called.” 
When the fourth object was presented to the child, the experimenter said: ”Oh, 
look, this is a Puhne, we have a Puhne here, look at the Puhne.” , labeling the 
novel object with a novel name three times. After the child explored the 
“Puhne”, it was handed to experimenter 2, who said: ”Ah, a Grieber, this is a 
Grieber, I like this Grieber.”, labeling the same object with a second novel 
name. The experimenter also demonstrated a function of the novel object, for 
example pretending to try and eat it to cue the object was edible. The object 
was then handed back to the child to briefly explore again. The function was 
introduced at the end of each set to have no interference between the two 
labels children heard for one object.  
Test phase. 
All four objects were then placed on a tray in front of the child. The 
unfamiliar and double-labeled objects were placed on a different position on the 
tray for each of the trials. The remaining objects were positioned randomly on 
the tray. One experimenter asked the child to identify one of the familiar items: 
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“Show me the car.”, and then to identify the labeled unfamiliar object (target): 
“Show me the Puhne.” The other experimenter then asked for the second 
familiar item. He further asked for the target using the label introduced by him, 
reasoning with the function presented before: “Show me the Grieber, I am 
hungry.”. The order of experimenter to start the questioning was 
counterbalanced, the function was always demonstrated at the final demand for 
an object (familiar object – target object – familiar object – target + function). 
Each experimenter used the novel word he/she had introduced before. The 
function demonstrated was always presented by the experimenter who had 
introduced it. 
Example of a set of items: 
A car, a toy duck, an item made up of several curlers, a piece of bath salt in a 
candy-like form.  
 
    
   
1. Puhne 
2. Grieber + 
function 
 
Misnaming task. 
The task used four sheets with nine different pictures of familiar items for 
the vocabulary check. Each sheet included two target items. The target items 
were later presented in the test phase on individual sheets of paper. A full list of 
all items can be found in appendix D. Target items were similar to the ones 
used in Waxman and Hatch (1992) if the names could be translated into 
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German in a reasonable way. Each target item had to be easily identified by 
preschool children on three different levels: subordinate, basic and 
superordinate labels, for example: parrot, bird, animal. 
Vocabulary check. 
Each child went through a vocabulary check similarly to the one the 
alternative naming task introduced. This ensured the child’s ability to identify 
each target item by three different labels. During the first set, the child was for 
example asked to point to a ladybird. The child was then asked to point to a 
beetle at the second show of the same sheet, and to an insect in third instance. 
If the child could not identify the item, the correct one was pointed out. 
Training phase. 
Puppet “Lisa” was introduced to the child. The experimenter explained 
that Lisa wanted to learn a lot of new words and the child was going to help 
teaching her. A picture of a rose was then placed in front of the child with the 
instruction: “Look at this. We want Lisa to learn many words for this picture. We 
want her to know, this can be called a rose. It can also be called a flower. And 
we can call it a plant. See, three names for one picture. Lisa should learn it’s 
called a rose, a flower and a plant.”  
Test phase. 
A set of eight pictures was then presented to the child, one at a time. 
The puppet looked at the picture and asked a set of three contrasting 
questions, aiming to draw three different responses from the child. The 
questions consisted of a contrasting sub-, basic, and superordinate label. 
Questions were counterbalanced so a child would either receive all in 
ascending or descending order, starting with the sub- or superordinate label 
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first. For a picture of a police car, the child was asked for example: “Is this a fire 
engine? - Is this a plane? – Is this furniture?” and the target responses would 
be “police car – car – vehicle”. If the child responded by shaking her head or 
with “no”, encouragement was given: “What is it then?”  
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Results 3a 
Task performance. 
Children’s performance on the false belief tasks, the alternative naming 
task, the pragmatic cue task and the disambiguation task was scored by pass 
or fail. Criteria were the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
Table 4 Task performance 
 Fail Pass Transition 
False belief 1 18 20  
False belief 2 17 21  
False belief combined 14 17 7 
Alternative naming 15 23  
Pragmatic cue 20 18  
Disambiguation task 7 31  
 
 
Comparing individual tasks. 
False belief. 
Children had to answer all three questions correctly in order to pass 
each false belief task. False belief 1 was passed by 53% of the children, false 
belief 2 was passed by 55% of the children. One of the failing children failed the 
reality question in addition to the belief question in task 1 and a different child in 
task 2. All children answered the memory question correctly. Children who 
passed one of the false belief tasks but not the other were assigned to the 
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“Transition” group (18% of the children). Data from false belief 1 and false belief 
2 was added up to false belief combined. 
 
Alternative naming. 
Children were asked to identify target items by pointing in the vocabulary 
check. An average of .55/8 mistakes were made (SD = .65, range: 0 – 2). The 
majority of children made no mistakes (52.6%, 20), 39.5 % (15) made 1 
mistake, 7.9 % (3) made 2 mistakes.  
The alternative naming task was passed by correctly producing basic 
and superordinate label for two of the pictures (e.g. fruit and apple). The 39 % 
children who failed the task produced on average 2.13 basic level labels (SD = 
1.55) and .60 superordinate labels (SD = .63). The remaining children produced 
on average 3.78 basic labels (SD = .42) and 2.65 superordinate labels (SD = 
.71). 
 
Pragmatic cue and disambiguation task. 
Children chose the familiar object as referent for the novel word on 
average 3.11 (SD = 1.82) in the pragmatic cue task, compared to .63 times (SD 
= 1.32) in the disambiguation task, a highly significant difference: t = 8.152, df = 
37, p < .001, d = 2.68. 
Both tasks were followed by a recall phase. Children correctly identified 
on average 3.03 (SD = 2.26) of pictures after the pragmatic cue task and 2.97 
(SD = 2.39) in the disambiguation task, a non-significant difference (p = .861), 
both significantly different from chance (PC: t = 7.71, df = 37, p < .001; DT: t = 
7.16, df = 37, p < .001). 
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Correction task. 
The child was presented with an array of two familiar and two unfamiliar 
objects. One of the unfamiliar objects was labelled differently by the two 
experimenters, the other one remained unnamed. Children were asked to 
identify both familiar objects by pointing (“Show me the car”). All children apart 
from 1 pointed to the correct familiar items on all occasions. This one child 
pointed to a toy duck when asked for bread, but then correctly identified the 
duck when asked for the duck. 
Children were scored as avoiding overlap if they picked the unnamed 
novel item as referent for one of the two newly introduced labels and the target 
object as referent for the other novel label. No child refused to make a choice. 
Children avoided overlap on average on 2.87/4 cases (SD = 1.28). Overall, 
45% (17/38) of the children avoided overlap on all sets and only 5% (2/38) 
applied both labels to the target object on all sets. Performance did not differ in 
relation to whether the first or second experimenter introduced the cued label (t 
= -.854, df = 36, p = .399) or whether the cue was given pre- or post- novel 
label (t = .630, df = 36, p = .533).  
Following the original task by Frank and Poulin-Dubois (2002), children 
were divided by age into two approximately equal groups. A main effect of age 
was observed (F (1,30) =  10.084, p = .003, partial ŋ2 = .252), with younger 
children avoiding overlap significantly more often (mean = 3.56, SD = .62 vs 
mean = 2.25, SD = 1.41, Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 Percentage of children accepting and avoiding label overlap  
Age split:   N = 18, mean age = 43 m, 36 – 50 m, SD = 4 m, 4 yr olds                                                             
N = 20, mean age = 62 m, 53 – 79 m, SD = 7 m, 5 yr olds 
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Comparing tasks overall. 
Performance on the combined false belief task, the alternative naming 
task, the pragmatic cue and disambiguation task and the correction task were 
entered in a correlational analysis. 
 
Table 5 Correlation of tasks 
 
FB 
combi 
AN PC PC recall DT DT recall 
Correction 
task 
Age .57*** .59*** .68*** .10 -.32 .11 .59*** 
False belief 
combined 
 .61*** .63*** .24 -.16 .09 .46** 
Alternative 
naming 
  .66*** .23 -.22 .12 .52** 
Pragmatic cue    .39* -.33* .43** .53** 
PC recall     -.26 .69*** .26 
Disambiguation 
task 
     -.07 .25 
DT recall       .33* 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
 
Children’s ability to produce familiar alternative labels and accept an 
unfamiliar label for an already named object correlates strongly with false belief. 
As for the correction task, children’s tendency to select the newly labeled target 
item twice and accept two labels correlates with age, false belief, alternative 
naming and pragmatic cue. This correlation disappears once age is partialled 
out. 
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Table 6 Partial correlations, partialling out age 
 
Alternative 
naming 
Pragmatic cue 
Disambiguation 
task 
Correction task 
False belief combi .42* .40* .03 -.18 
Alternative 
naming 
 .43** -.04 -.25 
Pragmatic cue   -.16 -.21 
Disambiguation 
task 
   .08 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01 
 
Children failing false belief did not disambiguate to the same level in the 
pragmatic cue as in the disambiguation task (Table 7).  
 
Table 7 Novel object chosen by false belief performance for PC and DT task 
 
FB fail 
(n = 14) 
FB transition 
(n = 7) 
FB pass 
(n = 17) 
PC novel object,  
mean (SD) 
3.36*/**(1.55) 1.57 ***(1.27) .82**** (1.43) 
DT novel object,  
mean (SD) 
4.79 (.58) 3.71 (1.89) 4.29 (1.45) 
* significantly different to FB transition (p = .035)  
and FB pass (p < .001; post-hoc Bonferroni); (F (2,35) = 11.964, p < .001) 
** significantly difference to DT FB fail (t = -3.98, df = 13, p = .002) 
*** significantly different to DT FB transition (t = -2.68, df = 6, p = .037) 
**** significantly different to DT FB pass (t = -8.42, df = 16, p < .001) 
 
The false belief failers were split by age and their selection of the novel 
object was compared for both tasks. Unfortunately, the number of young 
children in this experiment was extremely limited and the age range of FB 
failers was large. Table 8 illustrates, that the youngest FB failers disambiguate 
to similar levels and start to change decision with age increase. The sample 
size in each age range is very small, though. 
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Table 8 PC and DT for FB failers: 14 children  
 
Mean age = 44 m, SD = 7 m 
PC novel object  
Mean = 3.36, SD = 1.55 
DT novel object 
Mean = 4.79, SD = .58 
Age 36-38, (n = 4) Mean = 4.25 Mean = 5.00 
Age 40-44, (n = 5) Mean = 3.40 Mean = 4.80 
Age 49-56, (n = 5) Mean = 2.60 Mean = 4.60 
 
Misnaming task 
Children misidentified an average of 1.76 (SD = 1.50) target words 
during the initial vocabulary check. Most words were superordinate labels (1.63, 
SD = 1.34) Only .03 basic labels were misidentified (SD = .16) and .11 
subordinate labels (SD = .31). Older children identified significantly more target 
words than younger children (t = 3.822, df = 36, p = .001, d = 1.274; 4 yr olds: 
mean = 2.61, SD = 1.50; 5 yr olds: mean = 1.0, SD = 1.03). 
Each target could elicit up to three different labels; children persevering 
with one label received a score of 1, 2 different labels were scored as 2, and 3 
different labels as 3. The younger group produced an average of 1.14 (SD = 
.23) labels per target, compared to an average of 1.31 (SD = .42) in the older 
group, a non-significant difference (t = -1.536, df = 36, p = .135, d = -0.512). 
There was no effect of order (ascending mean = 1.18, SD = .25; descending 
mean = 1.28, SD = .43; t = -.869, df = 36, p = .391).  
Children produced significantly more subordinate answers (68% of all 
answers), than basic (23%) or superordinate (3%) answers, F(2,72) = 159.049, 
p< .001, partial ŋ2 = .815 (all pairwise comparisons p < .001, Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 Proportion of labels production per target 
 
Comparing the response pattern for the different age groups, 56% of the 
four year olds produced no alternative label for any target and persevered with 
the first answer given. No child in this age group was able to name any 
alternative for any target. In the older age group, 40% of children produced no 
alternative label, two children were able to produce one alternative for each 
target.  
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Discussion 3a 
Similarly to Experiment 1 and 2, children showed distinctly different 
behaviour in the disambiguation and pragmatic cue task. While the novel object 
was picked across age ranges in the majority of cases in the disambiguation 
task, the pragmatic cue task displayed a different picture of responses. Children 
passing the pragmatic cue task also passed the other metacognitive tasks. The 
false belief task, alternative naming task and the pragmatic cue task correlated 
strongly. The relation remained stable after age was taken into account. The 
connection between the tasks was therefore again demonstrated and with 
children from a different native language background. Word learning was also 
presented as children performed a recall task after pragmatic cue and 
disambiguation. Word learning did not show a relation to metacognitive abilities. 
As children learn a large amount of language before they understand the more 
abstract use, this is not surprising.  
In the correction task, younger children displayed a strong tendency to 
avoid two labels overlapping. The older age group (mean age = 35 months) in 
Frank and Poulin-Dubois’ (2002) study avoided overlap on average 2.26/4 
times, significantly more often than the younger group (mean age = 27 months, 
avoid overlap 1.24/4). In Experiment 3a, the younger group was closer in age 
(mean age = 43 months) to Frank and Poulin-Dubois’ older group and avoided 
overlap on 3.56/4. This would match Frank and Poulin-Dubois’ explanation that 
children display stronger mutual exclusivity when getting older. But the older 
children in the new study (mean age = 62 months) avoided overlap significantly 
less, only on 2.25/4 cases. The trend was therefore reversed. These 
differences can be explained by the added pragmatic cue in the new task. 
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Young children in the new task cannot consider the additional pragmatic 
information and need to select two different objects for two different novel labels 
in the test situation. These children performed similarly to the children in Frank 
and Poulin-Dubois study, although additional pragmatic information was given. 
The older children in the new study started to use the pragmatic information 
and select the target twice, accepting overlap. The ability to accept both labels 
was displayed in relation to false belief understanding, as the perspectival 
account would predict.  
Waxman and Hatch’s (1992) findings could not be repeated. The 
younger children in this study mostly persevered with their first answer and did 
not produce more labels in line with the different categorical questions. Even 
older children did not produce similar results as in the original study. The 
majority of children persevered with the first label they produced. One concern 
was the repeated questioning children were exposed to. This might have 
seemed odd and unnatural and encouraged Children to stick with the first label 
they had given. This was addressed in the following study. 
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Experiment 3b 
Method 
Participants. 
Of the 38 children in Experiment 3a, 24 (11 girls) were available to 
perform an additional task on a separate day (mean age = 55 m , SD = 9 m, 
range:  40 – 70m).  
 
Design. 
The additional task was performed on a different day to the original 
misnaming task, with approximately two weeks between tasks. 
 
Procedure and materials. 
The procedure for the vocabulary check was identical, using four new 
target items only (Appendix E). The test phase differed from the original. First, a 
new puppet was introduced. Then, the pictures were presented one at a time 
and the puppet asked only one question before moving on to the next picture, 
starting either at the sub- or superordinate mislabelling level. Arriving at the first 
picture shown again, the puppet continued to mislabel, now at the basic level. 
Finally, the remaining set of questions was asked going through the pictures a 
third time. This manipulation was introduced to see if changes between pictures 
would elicit a different answer from the child and reduce the possibility of 
perseverance. This would give clearer evidence of whether children would 
respond on the hierarchical level they were exposed to. The repeated 
questioning introduced in Experiment 3a might also have seemed strange to 
some children.  
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Results 3b 
Children made on average .46/12 mistakes during the vocabulary check 
(SD = .59). The younger group made .50 (SD = .67) mistakes compared to .42 
(SD = .52) in the older group, a non-significant difference (t = .340, df = 22, p = 
.737, d = .144). Mistakes were made mostly by misidentifying superordinate 
labels (mean = .42, SD = .50). No basic labels were misidentified and only a 
mean of .04 (SD = .20) subordinate labels. 
Age split:   N = 12, mean age = 47 m, 40 – 53 m, SD = 4 m, 4 yr olds                                                             
N = 12, mean age = 62 m, 55 – 70 m, SD = 5 m, 5 yr olds 
The four year olds produced on average 1.38 labels per target (SD = 
.27), compared to 1.46 (SD = .53) produced by five year olds (t = -.484, df = 22, 
p = .635, d = -0.206). Children produced significantly more subordinate (45% of 
all answers) and basic answers (45%), than superordinate (4%) answers, 
F(2,44) = 49.383, p< .001, partial ŋ2 = .692 (Figure 5; pairwise comparisons: 
basic vs superordinate, p < .001; sub vs superordinate, p < .001; subordinate 
vs. basic, p = .367). 
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Figure 5 Proportion of labels produced per target 
 
Comparison Experiment 3a and b. 
It was of interest whether children would be able to give an answer on a 
matching level and find it easier to resist perseverance than in Experiment 3a. 
Similarly to Experiment 3a, each target could elicit up to three different labels. 
Children persevering with one label received a score of 1, 2 different labels 
were scored as 2, and 3 different labels as 3. The proportion of mean 
perseverance was calculated for each child and task and compared for both 
tasks. The 24 children who undertook both studies produced an average of 
1.31 (SD = .38) in Experiment 3a and an average of 1.52 (SD = .65) in 
Experiment 3b. The difference was not significant (t = 1.645, df = 23, p = .114). 
Children were therefore not producing significantly more labels in the new 
condition. 
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Children gave a subordinate answer in response to a subordinate 
misnaming on average 2.5/4 (SD = 1.02) times, a basic in response to a basic 
misnaming on average 2.42/4 (SD = .88) times and a matching superordinate 
answer to a superordinate misnaming .42/4 (SD = .83) times. Pairwise 
comparison revealed significant differences between superordinate and basic (t 
= 8.880, df = 23, p < .001) and superordinate and subordinate answers (t = -
8.961, df = 23, p < .001). Comparing this to the matching responses children 
gave in Experiment 3a, a significant difference was found on the basic level (t = 
5.816, df = 23, p < .001), with children in Experiment 3b being more likely to 
respond on a basic level when presented with a basic term (Table 9). 
Table 9 Proportion of matching responses per child and task 
 3 a) 3 b) 
Subordinate misnaming, subordinate response,  
mean (SD) 
.69 (.22) .63 (.26) 
Basic misnaming, basic response,  
mean (SD) 
.26 (.15) .57 (.21) 
Superordinate misnaming, superordinate response, mean 
(SD) 
.10 (.16) .09 (.19) 
 
Comparison alternative naming and misnaming tasks. 
The alternative naming task described in Experiment 3a required 
children to produce an alternative label for a picture in response to the 
experimenter labeling it. Both misnaming tasks also required children to 
produce a label. The difference was that the experimenter mislabeled the 
original picture. Task demand might be comparable, though, as children are 
asked to switch to another label in the misnaming task. A correlational analysis 
was performed for alternative naming and both misnaming tasks. The 
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misnaming tasks included 3 possible labels per item, different to the alternative 
naming task. Hence, children were scored to produce either none or any 
alternatives per item, comparing proportions. There was no correlation between 
children’s ability to produce correct alternative names in the alternative naming 
task and their ability to switch from one correct label to another one (all r < .358, 
all p > .086). Both misnaming tasks further did not present correlations to the 
combined false belief data (all r < .165, all p > .440), whereas alternative 
naming correlated strongly (r = .454, p = .026). 
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Discussion 3b 
As the children in Experiment 3a showed very different results in a 
repeat of Waxman and Hatch’s (1992) procedure, a variation of the task was 
conducted. This was expected to be much easier for children, as it did not 
include repeat questioning when faced with one picture. The variation produced 
slightly different results, but children were not able to produce significantly more 
labels. An increase of basic level labels was observed. Whereas children in 
Experiment 3a most often responded with a subordinate label, children in 
Experiment 3b produced equal amounts of subordinate and basic level labels. 
Children behaved according to the perspectival account’s predictions. In 
Experiment 3a, they assign a label in response to the experimenter’s 
misnaming. They would be expected to stick with the label as the conversation 
is still on-going with the same counterpart. In Experiment 3b children could 
show more flexibility, as every time the picture is presented again, the 
possibility to produce a different label is given. Indeed, children produce more 
basic level labels than in Experiment 3a, but not overall significantly more 
labels. 
A further question was to address whether the misnaming task touched 
on similar abilities as the alternative naming task. If so, a relation to false belief 
would be expected. But no relationship was found in either version of the 
misnaming task. The misnaming task neither related to false belief, nor to 
alternative naming. It cannot be presented as another metalinguistic task.  
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Discussion 1,2,3 
The first 3 studies presented were able to establish the new pragmatic 
cue task as a novel task measuring metalinguistic awareness. The task proved 
to be replicable and reliable. Children’s ability to consider a pragmatic cue when 
disambiguating a novel word strongly relates to their ability to predict belief 
based behaviour. Perner et al’s (2002) perspectival understanding of the task is 
going to be applied in the following in contrast to other claims around the 
disambiguation effect.  
In the literature, there have been two general suggestions. The first is 
that children assume that object kinds have only one name, the mutual 
exclusivity bias (Markman & Wachtel, 1988). This bias would limit the number 
of hypotheses that need to be considered for the referent of a novel word, and 
is plausibly a useful word-learning heuristic. This theory can accommodate 
some of the present findings. The developmental change in selection of the 
familiar object in the pragmatic cue task could reflect a greater reliance on 
pragmatic information. Supporters of lexical principles accounts acknowledge 
that children use numerous cues to determine word meaning, and that the ME 
bias is gradually relaxed over time. 
However, the lexical principles account is unable to explain why the 
change occurs around the age of four years, nor why it is associated with other 
metacognitive developments. In particular, the first two studies show that 
children’s difficulties accepting a novel name for a familiar object are very 
similar to their difficulties using coreferential names that have already been 
learned. The ME bias therefore does not seem to be specific to word learning. 
The second general explanation of the disambiguation effect is that it results 
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from inferences about speaker intentions: had the speaker intended to refer to 
the familiar object, she would have used the familiar name (Bloom, 2000; 
Diesendruck, 2005; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). Children almost certainly 
use cues to speakers’ intentions to guide their word learning. However, in the 
pragmatic cue disambiguation task, younger children did not use a clear 
pragmatic cue to the speaker’s intended meaning. This suggests that selection 
of the novel object in the standard disambiguation task is not due to 
sophisticated inferences about the speaker’s mental states. Instead, the role of 
theory of mind developments in the disambiguation effect is to allow children to 
suspend it when not appropriate, as is the case in the PC task. 
An alternative explanation of the disambiguation task was suggested by 
Perner et al. (2002), following suggestions by Flavell (1988) and Markman 
(1989). Perner et al. hypothesise that the ME bias is related to understanding of 
perspective, which they also claim is the link between the false belief and 
alternative naming tasks. The current findings support the general claim and 
allow more specific conclusions. The data suggest that younger children are 
unable to choose the familiar object for a novel word. This is not because the 
word is novel, but is because children cannot conceive of an object having 
more than one name. This is why they show comparable difficulties with the 
alternative naming task, and why they become able to pass both tasks at the 
same age. 
It may seem counterintuitive to attribute the disambiguation effect to a 
metacognitive limitation. After all, choosing a novel object as referent of a novel 
name is typically the pragmatically most sensible response. Adults also show 
the effect (e.g. Au & Glusman, 1990). The difference is that adults and older 
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children can respond differently. The effect of this limitation may simply be a 
fortuitous coincidence. Alternatively, it may be that sensible pragmatic 
considerations are built into the basic apparatus of naming. For example, 
Doherty and Perner (2013) suggest that a basic constraint prevents the 
attachment of more than one defining label to objects for the duration of a 
conversation. Such a constraint would prevent potential confusion generated by 
having multiple labels, and therefore multiple perspectives, for the same object. 
Adults certainly rapidly converge on a common set of referents in a 
conversation (conceptual pacts; Brennan & Clark, 1996) and children show 
similar phenomena (Matthews, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2008). Thus the presented 
studies are consistent with the original idea that the ME bias is a useful 
constraint, although on language use rather than on word learning as such. 
They are also consistent with the idea that the bias is pragmatic in nature. 
However, this is unlikely to result from explicit pragmatic reasoning, but from 
automatic constraints built into the basic mechanics of discourse.  
Findings from the misnaming task (Waxman & Hatch, 1992) could not be 
repeated, even with simplifying changes.  
Findings from the correction task (after Frank & Poulin-Dubois, 2002) 
were addressed in a modified version, applying the pragmatic cue paradigm. 
The ability to accept two previously presented labels was strong when 
suggested by pragmatic information for children passing false belief. Young 
children did not accept two labels for one object, they corrected one of the 
original ones.  
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Introduction II - Monolingual and bilingual children 
The previous experiments presented the pragmatic cue task as new 
addition to the range of metacognitive tasks demonstrating developmental 
change in behaviour in normal developing children around the age of four, 
indicated by children’s theory of mind. As the pragmatic cue task is concerned 
with children’s word learning, a potentially challenging field should be 
addressed: bilingual children’s word learning. Bilingual children are constantly 
exposed to multiple labels for referents within and between languages 
surrounding them. Their metalinguistic awareness might be enhanced and be 
subject to a different developmental trajectory.  
Bilingual’s metarepresentational abilities on the other hand might also 
develop earlier, which would show whether both abilities are expressions of an 
underlying concept. Hence, if bilingual children’s metalinguistic awareness and 
theory of mind development are not as connected as in monolinguals, the 
perspectival account will be challenged.  
Previous research into bilingual children’s word learning and theory of 
mind development presents very inconsistent results at best. Some studies 
suggest less or no disambiguation effect, which would suggest young bilingual 
children do not show the same metalinguistic immaturity caused by the effect. 
Other studies suggest earlier theory of mind development.  
Investigations into early differences around the disambiguation effect 
often apply the preferential looking paradigm, presented by Halberda (2003). 
Monolingual 17 month old children were shown to increase looking at a novel 
object in the presence of a familiar object when listening to a novel name. 
Younger children did not show the same results and it was concluded 
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monolingual infants start to disambiguate reliably around this age in 
development.  
Byers-Heinlein and Werker (2009) used the Halberda’s study design to 
investigate differences between monolingual, bilingual and trilingual children 
between the ages of 17-18 months. Monolinguals significantly increased their 
attention to the novel object when presented with a novel word. Bilinguals did 
so only marginally. Trilingual children did not increase their attention towards 
the novel object upon hearing a novel word at all. The authors concluded that 
disambiguation is a result of knowledge about the familiar object, not a result of 
absent knowledge about the novel object. Children with more than one 
language might show less disambiguation, because they don’t know a label for 
a familiar object in all languages available to them yet and might therefore 
consider the familiar object as referent.  
Another study following Halberda’s procedure compared a group of 
monolingual children aged 17 to 22 months to bilingual children, matched on 
age and vocabulary size (Houston-Price, Caloghiris, & Raviglione, 2010). The 
authors found a clear disambiguation effect in monolingual children, while 
bilingual children at the same age showed no evidence of this. This was 
explained with monolingual’s tendency to avoid selecting familiar objects as 
referents for unfamiliar labels. Bilinguals encounter this situation often and do 
not immediately look for novel objects when hearing novel words. Hence, this 
study applied the same set-up as Byers-Heinlein and Werker (2009) with the 
same age range and returned slightly different results for the bilingual children. 
Bilingual preschool children between the age of four and six were first 
compared to their monolingual peers on the mutual exclusivity bias by Au and 
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Glusman (1990). They found bilinguals and monolinguals to be equally willing 
to accept two novel labels from two different languages for one object. 
Monolingual children disambiguated within their language and avoided overlap 
of novel terms. Being informed that a novel word would be in a foreign 
language lead them to assign labels randomly. But being asked whether a 
previously (English) labelled object could have a second name in Spanish 
made 89% of monolinguals accept overlap. The authors suggested that explicit 
task instructions lead to the same presentation of metalinguistic abilities in 
monolinguals and bilinguals at this age.  
In a comparison between monolingual and bilingual three to four, and 
five to six year olds, no significant differences were found within the younger 
age groups (Davidson, Jergovic, Imami, & Theodos, 1997). The younger 
monolinguals and half of the younger bilinguals disambiguated significantly 
above chance level (69% and 65% of trials), the other half of the younger 
bilinguals were close to this (60%). The older monolinguals selected the novel 
target in response to the novel word at ceiling level (92%) and significantly 
more often than the older bilingual group (69%). Disambiguation was therefore 
detected in bilingual children in this study from the age of three and not 
increasing at the same rate as in monolingual children. 
Davidson and Tell (2005) found further differences between monolingual 
and bilingual children also only in an older age group. They used a task 
introduced by Markman and Wachtel (1988), presenting children with the 
decision whether a novel word referred to a whole object or a salient part. This 
was done to show, that children will look for a substance or part of the object as 
referent for a second label rather than accepting the new label as an alternative 
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name. Davidson and Tell (2005) found three and four year old monolingual to 
select a part of a familiar object as referent for a novel word in 90% and 
bilingual in 82% of all cases. The older bilingual children accepted two names 
for the whole object significantly more often than the monolinguals (35% BL 
accepting overlap compared to 3% ML). Monolingual’s disambiguation 
increased significantly with age, but not bilinguals, similarly to the first author’s 
study presented before.  
Diesendruck (2005) found bilingual children to display a disambiguation 
effect if they interact with a bilingual puppet and the puppet was present while 
the bilingual experimenter labelled one of two figures (70% of all cases). If the 
puppet was absent or monolingual (not understanding the test language), 
children picked at chance level between two figures at puppet’s demand for a 
newly introduced label (Bl+absent 53%, ML+present: 45%, ML+absent: 52% 
disambiguation). The author explained that bilingual children use their 
knowledge about speaker knowledge to interpret the situation. If a speaker has 
more than one language, bilingual children tend to disambiguate less.  
Merriman and Kutlesic (1993) tested monolingual and bilingual children 
between the age of five to six and seven to eight on the correction effect. They 
first taught children a novel name for a novel object and asked children to help 
a puppet pick more referents of this label from an array of objects which had 
varying similarities and either shared a special feature or not (1st sorting). The 
child was then introduced to another novel name for one of the objects by a 
new puppet speaking either the child’s or a foreign language. Children were 
then asked to pick all referents of the second novel label from the array (2nd 
sorting). After objects were placed back, they were reminded of the first label 
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and asked to pick the corresponding objects(3rd sorting). In the same language 
condition, older children were significantly more likely to correct the first label 
and avoid objects with corrected labels in the third sorting. No differences 
between bilingual and monolingual children were observed. But in the different 
language condition, bilinguals were more likely to accept overlap compared to 
monolinguals. This was again explained with their constant exposure to multiple 
labels across languages.  
Research with children around the age of two found monolinguals and 
bilinguals to be equally likely to display a correction effect (Frank & Poulin-
Dubois, 2002). The study presented a slightly different version of a correction 
task, introduced by Savage and Au (1996). In Savage and Au’s task, children 
were taught two novel words for an object by two experimenters. About half of 
the three to five year olds accepted and used both labels. The other half 
persevered with the label which was first tested. No age effects were observed. 
Frank and Poulin-Dubois (2002) presented monolingual and bilingual children, 
aged 26-28 months and 34-36 months with a correction task. Children were 
taught a new label for a novel object by one experimenter (“Mido”). Then the 
other experimenter named the same object with a different novel name (“Gavi”). 
Children were next presented with a set of four objects, two familiar, an 
unfamiliar and the previously labelled novel target. Each experimenter then 
asked for the target, using the label introduced by her, requesting the familiar 
objects in between as filler items. Monolingual and bilingual children avoided 
two labels for one object at similar level and significantly more in the older 
group (younger group: 31 & 39%, older group: 57 & 58%). Bilingual children 
additionally performed the task in two languages, with one experimenter 
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addressing them in English, the other in French. The same pattern of results 
occurred across languages (younger group: 38%, older group: 57%). The 
authors concluded that this was probably the critical time in development when 
monolingual children start to disambiguate clearly within, and bilingual children 
additionally between languages.  
The sensitivity to cues in regard to word meaning was examined in an 
experiment including 30 month old children (Brodje, Ahmed, & Colunga, 2012). 
Children were introduced to a novel object and taught a novel name for it 
(“zuly”). They were then presented with further novel objects and asked to find 
more “zuly” on the table. Pragmatic cues (eye gaze) were given towards shape 
matches or colour/texture matches. Children have been previously found to 
prefer shape matches to classify object groups (Jones, Smith, & Landau, 1991). 
Bilingual, but not monolingual children considered the experimenter’s eye gaze 
in situations, when pragmatic cues and object property did not match. Both 
groups were able to attend to cues in control conditions. The authors 
suggested, that bilingual children need to examine the speaker’s cues to 
resolve the constant conflict of knowing more than one label for a single object. 
Young bilinguals might therefore rely on referential cues from adults in slightly 
ambiguous situations. 
The ability to differentiate between the two languages was examined in a 
study by Tare and Gelman (2010). Bilingual children around the age of three 
and four, speaking English and Marathi, were tested on a variety of language-
based and metacognitive tasks. Children interacted with one experimenter 
speaking English and one experimenter speaking Marathi. They were 
presented with objects and asked to name them, once in each language. A free 
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play session with each experimenter also recorded the spontaneous use of the 
individual language. Both age groups showed differentiation in the free play 
task, with children using the speaker’s language the majority of the time and 
switching between both experimenters. Children’s ability to name objects was 
stronger in English than Marathi. Children who did not provide the label in the 
correct language were given up to three prompts to switch. Responsiveness to 
prompts was significantly correlated to children’s metalinguistic awareness 
(measured by a language check which asked children about the experimenter’s 
languages and how they would name certain objects). Responsiveness to 
prompts was further related to theory of mind measures (3 tasks from Wellman 
& Liu, 2004: diverse desire, diverse belief, knowledge access), even after 
controlling for age effects. The authors suggested that better theory of mind 
scores enable children to reflect closely on the experimenter’s language 
abilities. They further concluded that metalinguistic awareness related closely to 
theory of mind, as metalinguistic abilities predicted children’s responsiveness to 
a language only in connection with metacognitive ability.  
General cognitive differences between monolingual and bilingual 
children were the focus of a series of studies. A meta-analysis looking at 
studies concerned with the cognitive outcome of bilingualism reliably identified 
increased attentional control and better working memory abilities. Higher 
metalinguistic and metarepresentational skills were further pointed out 
(Adesope, Lavin, Thompson, & Ungerleider, 2010).  
Increased attentional control was also found in bilingual children 
(Bialystok & Majumder, 1998), as well as better abilities to inhibit in dimensional 
card sorting tasks (Bialystok & Martin, 2004). Bilingual children performed 
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comparably to monolinguals on several other cognitive measures, as for 
example working memory, though. 
Further investigations of word mapping and executive inhibition found a 
higher tendency in monolingual children to disambiguate novel words. 
Bilinguals performed again better on inhibition tasks. No connection between 
the tendency to disambiguate and inhibition was found for any of the groups. 
(Bialystok, Barac, Blaye, & Poulin-Dubois, 2010).  
Developmental differences have therefore been found for 
disambiguation, with bilinguals showing the effect later and less pronounced. 
This could question the perspectival accounts claim that disambiguation in 
young children is the result of cognitive immaturity (and in older children and 
adults the result of a sensible decision). The account would predict bilingual 
children to disambiguate similarly to monolinguals and suspend the effect when 
presented with pragmatic cues at the same time as they pass false belief.  
It is also of interest whether bilinguals show superior alternative naming 
performance. They are constantly exposed to multiple labels for one object 
between languages; they might demonstrate more flexibility within as well. The 
perspectival account would not predict any differences, as alternative labels 
specify different perspectives on objects. And the understanding of perspective 
as indicated by the ability to pass false belief is necessary to flexibly apply 
alternative labels in a conversation, if not externally induced.  
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Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 46 children (23 girls), recruited from local nurseries 
and child-minders in Scotland and England. Parents signed a consent form and 
gave information regarding their children’s language background. They also 
confirmed no history of language or hearing impairment and no exposure of 
their children to German language through language classes or other teaching. 
Children were assigned to one of 3 groups: Monolingual children (n = 16, 8 
girls, mean age = 48 months, range = 39 – 64, SD = 8) spoke English as their 
first and only language; Bilingual children (n = 18, 8 girls, mean age = 47 
months, range = 31 – 69, SD = 12) spoke English at an age appropriate level 
and one other language with either one or both parents at home (see Appendix 
F for list). Parents classed their children as fluent in the home language. 
Exposed children (n = 12, 7 girls, mean age = 49 months, range = 42 – 62, SD 
= 6) spoke English as their first and only language and went to regular 
language classes in their nurseries (Spanish/French). Language teaching was 
performed once a week for 30 minutes and children had attended classes for a 
minimum of 3 months. Bilinguals scored significantly lower on the BPVS 
standardized scores (BPVS standardized scores, monolingual: 101, SD = 14; 
bilingual: 88, SD = 15; exposed: 100, SD = 8; F (2,43) = .5.261, p = .009; Post-
hoc Bonferroni: bilingual vs monolingual, p = .015, bilingual vs exposed, p = 
.052, no significant difference between monolingual and exposed). 
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Design. 
Children performed ten tasks in randomized order over two sessions. 
These included a false belief task, an alternative naming task, a forward digit 
and a backward object span task and the bear–dragon task. Two 
disambiguation and pragmatic cue tasks presented novel words implicitly in 
English in one set and explicitly as words in a foreign language in the other. 
The BPVS III (Dunn, Dunn, Sewell, & Styles, 2009) was administered last. 
 
Procedure and Materials. 
False belief task. 
The false belief task was as for Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Alternative naming task. 
The materials were the same as in Experiment 3. The procedure was as 
in Experiment 2. 
 
Disambiguation task and pragmatic cue task, original (implicit English). 
Both tasks were identical to Experiment 1 and 2 (materials: Appendix B 
& G). The pragmatic cue task was followed by a recall task immediately after. 
(The disambiguation task was  not followed by a recall task here, as this was 
first introduced in experiment 5. Experiment 3 took place after 4 and 5, but was 
presented before to keep topical continuity.) 
Recall. 
The child was presented with all five pictures she had selected in 
response during the pragmatic cue task and asked: “Which one is Jimmy’s 
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hinkle?”, testing every novel word used before. Children were encouraged to 
point to an object for each of the novel words. 
 
Disambiguation task and pragmatic cue task, German. 
Children were introduced to the puppet Lisa and told “This is Lisa, she is 
from a different country, from Germany. Lisa doesn’t speak any English, only 
German. She has some pictures with her to show you.” The German 
disambiguation and pragmatic cue tasks followed the same procedure as the 
original tasks. Novel words were replaced by German words. (“Lisa is thirsty 
and would like Saft, please.”). 
 
All pictures, novel words, and pragmatic cues for the different trials are 
listed in Appendix H and I. Children had to select the familiar item on 4 
occasions to pass a pragmatic cue task and the novel item on 4 occasions to 
pass a disambiguation task. 
 
Forward digit span task. 
Instructions were as follows: “I’m going to tell you a few numbers now 
and I would like you to say them after me, ok? For example, I say ‘5,9’ then you 
say ‘5,9’. Let’s try that: I say 3,8, now you!” If the child responded correctly, a 
set of 3 numbers was offered next to ensure understanding. If the child did not 
replicate the two digits, the instruction was repeated and encouragement was 
given until the child responded. The testing started with a set of two digits, 
another set of 2 followed. The number of digits was increased by one after each 
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set of 2 (2 sets of 2 digits, 2 sets of 3 digits, and so on) until children responded 
wrongly to both sets.  
 
Backward object span task. 
Training phase. 
A set of two pictures was put in front of the child with the instruction: 
“This is a horse and this is a sheep. Look, I put this horse down ﬁrst and then 
this sheep. But I’m going to say the names of these two in a backwards order, 
so I say sheep (point) then horse (point). Now you say them in a backwards 
order (pointing at each picture to help).” The next set followed with the 
experimenter labelling each picture, but only pointing when it was the child’s 
turn to repeat backwards. This was practiced with another set of 3. Then the 
experimenter omitted pointing, only asked the child to repeat backwards (after 
Slade & Ruffman, 2005).  
Test phase. 
“Now I’m not going to put the pictures down, I’m just going to say the 
words. I want you to say what I say in a backwards order.” Pictures were 
provided again if the child failed on the first set of 2. Three sets of 3 and three 
sets of 4 were administered until the child failed on two consecutive trials.  
 
Bear – Dragon task. 
Children were introduced to Nice Teddy and Naughty Dragon. In a 
training phase they were instructed to perform any action Nice Teddy asked 
them to do (“Teddy says: Clap your hands!”) but to ignore Naughty Dragons 
commands. Each command was prefaced by “Teddy says” or “Dragon says”. 
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This was practiced with 5 commands from each puppet. Children were 
reminded of the instructions every time they failed. After 5 failures on the 
dragon trials they were instructed to sit on their hands before responding. The 
test trial followed immediately with 10 commands, 5 per puppet, in random 
order (after Reed, Pien, & Rothbart, 1984).  
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Results 4 
Task performance. 
Groups were compared on mean performances for the forward digit and 
backward object span task and the bear dragon task. The remaining tasks had 
set pass/fail criteria. No significant differences were found on task performance 
between monolinguals, bilinguals and children exposed to another language 
(Table 10). 
 
Table 10 Task performance by language group in percentage of children 
passing/ means 
 
Monolingual 
(n = 16) 
Bilingual 
(n = 18) 
Exposed 
(n = 12) 
Comparison 
FB pass  56 50 75 Χ
2
 (2) = 1.917, p = .384, d = .204 
AN pass (≥3)  50 39 42 Χ
2
 (2) = .447, p = .800, d = .099 
PC O pass (≥4)  56 50 75 Χ
2
 (2) = 1.917, p = .384, d = .204 
PC G pass (≥4)  56 56 58 Χ
2
 (2) = .023, p = .988, d = .023 
DT O pass (≥4)  94 61 83 Χ
2
 (2) = 5.549, p = .062, d = .347 
DT G pass (≥4)  75 72 75 Χ
2
 (2) = .044, p = .978, d = .031 
Forward digit 
Mean = 3.375, 
SD = 1.190 
Mean = 2.972, 
SD = 1.170 
Mean = 3.667, 
SD = .5365 
F (2,43) = 1.054, p = .357 
Backward object 
Mean = 2.94, 
SD = 4.20 
Mean = 3.50, 
SD = 4.70 
Mean =2.75, 
SD = 2.53 
F (2,43) = .144, p = .866 
Bear-dragon (≥8)  
Mean = 7.75, 
SD = 2.82 
Mean = 7.50, 
SD = 2.98 
Mean = 9.00, 
SD = 1.21 
F (2,43) = 1.32, p = .279 
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Comparing individual tasks. 
Pragmatic cue and disambiguation tasks. 
The performance of the three different language groups (number of 
correct responses 0-5) was analysed using a 3*2*2mixed ANOVA with between 
participants factor “language background” (monolingual, bilingual, exposed) and 
within participants factor “cue” (pragmatic/no cue) and “test language” 
(English/German version). The main effect of “cue” was significant: F (1,43) = 
99.828, p = .001, partial ŋ2 = .699. Children were more likely to select the 
familiar object as referent for the novel word in both pragmatic tasks (PC O: 
mean = 3.39, SD = 1.56; PC G: mean = 3.43, SD = 1.63) than in the 
disambiguation tasks (DT O: mean = .83, SD = 1.08; DT G: mean = 1.00, SD = 
1.25).   
The main effect of test language, the tree-way interaction and none of 
the two-way interactions were significant (all F < .89, all p > .418). 
The main effect of language background was not significant: F (2,43) = 
.839, p = .439, partial ŋ2 = .038, children in all 3 groups performed similarly. A 
planned comparison was performed between monolingual and bilingual children 
on the original disambiguation task, as the literature suggests differences on 
the general disambiguation effect (e.g. Davidson et al., 1997; Davidson & Tell, 
2005): Bilingual children displayed significantly less disambiguation than their 
monolingual peers (t = 3.215, df = 32, p = .003, d = 1.137; BL: mean 3.83/5, SD 
= 1.043; ML = 4.75/5, SD = .577). 
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Recall. 
Both pragmatic cue tasks were followed by a recall task. A paired sample 
t-test for each language background and both recall tasks presented significant 
differences for bilingual and exposed children (Table 12):  
 
Table 12 Recall after PC tasks (mean ± SD, max. = 5) 
 PC Original PC German Comparison 
Monolingual .44 ± .82 .56 ± .63 t = .565, df = 15, p = .580 
Bilingual .44 ± .86 1.67 ± 1.75 t = 2.572, df = 17, p = .020 
Exposed .42 ± .67 1.58 ± 1.83 t = 2.461, df = 11, p = .032 
 
In order to specifically test the assumption that speaking or starting to 
learn another language might influence the ability to recall novel words, 
bilingual and exposed children were combined for an analysis. No difference 
was detected between groups for the ability to correctly identify referents in the 
implicit English task (t = .024, df = 32, d = .008). The explicit German task 
revealed a significant group difference, with bilingual and exposed children 
identifying significantly more German words than monolingual children after 
only listening to them twice (ML mean = .56, SD = .629; BL+EP mean = 1.67, 
SD = 1.749; t = 2.503, df = 32, d = .8849).  
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Alternative naming. 
The initial vocabulary check demonstrated children’s knowledge about 
the task labels. Children made on average .64 (SD = .900, range: 0 – 3) 
mistakes. 26 (56.5%) children identified all pictures correctly, 13 (28.3%) 
mistook 1 picture, 4 (8.7%) children mistook 2 and 3 (6.5%) children mistook 3 
pictures.  
The 26 children failing the main task produced on average 2.69 (SD = 
1.289) basic and 1.15 (SD = .967) superordinate labels. The 20 children 
passing produced 3.80 (SD = .410) basic and 3.65 (SD = .489) superordinate 
labels. 
 
False belief. 
The false belief task was passed by answering all 3 questions correctly 
(belief, reality, memory). 58.7% (27) passed this task, all children answered the 
reality question correctly, 1 child failed the memory question as well as the 
belief question. 
 
Forward digit span task. 
Children were able to repeat on average 3.29 digits (SD = 1.31, range: 0 
– 6). All but 1 child passed the two training trials (1 set of 2, 1 set of 3). Four 
children did not repeat any more correct numbers after.  
 
Backward object span task. 
The training phase was counted as 4 sets, 40 children passed through 
this phase without mistakes. 6 (13%) children failed, 2 by repeating the labels in 
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forward order, ignoring all instruction. 4 children did not produce any labels. The 
data was included, as these children responded in the remaining tasks. 
Children scored 2 points for reversing a set of two words, 3 points for reversing 
a set of three. The maximum score possible was 27 (6 for three sets of two, 9 
for three sets of three, 12 for three sets of 4). The majority of children (52.2%, 
24) were able to reverse the first two sets of two words, 36.9% (17) mastered 
2x3 words. Three children (6.5%) were able to repeat 3x3 words backwards. 
 
Bear –dragon. 
All children were able to pass the initial training phase. The bear’s 
commands seemed easier for most children, 89.1% (41) performed all actions 
as demanded compared to 50% (23) of children correctly ignoring all dragon’s 
demands. The difference was highly significant: t = 4.635, df = 45, p ≤ .001.  
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Correlation of tasks. 
All tasks were entered in a correlational analysis in addition to age and 
the standardized score of the BPVS III (Table 13).  
 
Table 13 Correlation between task performance, age and verbal-mental age 
 VMA FB AN PC O 
PC O 
R 
DT O PC G 
PC G 
R 
DT G FDS BOS 
Bear 
Dragon 
Age .44** .52*** .67*** .54*** .54*** .33* .43** .20 .20 .68*** .50*** .69*** 
VMA   .48** .22 -.06 .36** .10 .10 .28 .51*** .46*** .51*** 
False belief    .62*** .68*** .04 -.00 .52*** .22 -.10 .52*** .36* .48** 
Alternative
Naming 
   .63*** .22 .42** .40** .08 .18 .59*** .47*** .51*** 
PC Original     .35* .09 .62*** .23 -.06 .62*** .35* .45** 
PC O 
Recall 
     .08 .13 .11 .11 .12 -.10 .12 
DT Original       -.02 -.10 .26 .18 .26 .22 
PC German        .42** -.08 .45** .22 .23 
PC G 
Recall 
        -.09 .12 .45** .03 
DT German          .18 .19 .19 
Forward 
DS 
          .43** .65*** 
Backward 
OS 
           .36* 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
 
Further analysing the strong correlation between the pragmatic cue 
tasks, the alternative naming task and the false belief task, a partial correlation 
was performed (Table 14). The influence of age, verbal-mental age, memory 
(forward digit), working memory (backward object) and inhibition (bear dragon) 
were taken into account. 
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Table 14 Partial correlations controlling for age, vma, executive functioning 
 Alternative naming 
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
Pragmatic cue, 
German 
False belief  .47** .67*** .45** 
Alternative naming  .39* .14   
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
  .45** 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
 
Comparison of tasks by groups. 
Children’s task performance was further compared for the individual 
language backgrounds. Monolingual children presented similar correlations to 
the complete group (Table 15, 16) 
Table 15 Correlation of tasks for monolingual children (n = 16) 
 VMA FB AN PC O 
PC O 
R 
DT O PC G 
PC G 
R 
DT G FDS BOS BD 
Age .15 .67** .68** .36 .28 .05 .32 .18 .27 .55* .41 .71** 
VMA  .30 .15 .03 -.22 -.16 -.20 .06 .35 .46 .27 .47 
False 
Belief  
  .74*** .69** .01 -.17 .58* .19 .04 .62* .35 .80*** 
AN    .54* .22 -.18 .37 .04 .39 .66** .43 .61* 
PC Original     .35 -.06 .73** .40 .20 .42 .18 .42 
PC O 
Recall 
     .25 -.10 .27 .31 .06 -.15 .11 
DT Original       -.12 .23 -.27 -.15 -.31 -.08 
PC German        .19 -.10 .27 -.04 .25 
PC G 
Recall 
        .03 .28 .29 .09 
DT German          .42 .31 .26 
Forward 
DS 
          .29 .82*** 
Backward 
OS 
           .26 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
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Table 16 Partial correlations for monolingual children, controlling for age and 
vma 
 Alternative naming 
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
Pragmatic cue, 
German 
False belief  .53 (p = .051) .69** .63* 
Alternative naming  .44 .25 
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
  .71** 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
 
Table 17 Correlation of tasks for bilingual children (n = 18) 
 VMA FB AN PC O 
PC O 
R 
DT O PC G 
PC G 
R 
DT G FDS BOS BD 
Age .68** .58* .82*** .70** .25 .64** .65** .32 .10 .74*** .63** .71** 
VMA  .45 .59* .38 .01 .69** .54* .48* .45 .52* .65* .54* 
False 
Belief  
  .72** .77*** .13 .27 .59* .52* .00 .62** .49* .25 
AN    .73** .30 .49* .64** .44 .28 .67** .74*** .54* 
PC Original     .35 .42 .56* .39 -.04 .78*** .59* .49* 
PC O 
Recall 
     .29 .17 -.09 .05 .13 .05 .12 
DT Original       .39 .29 .44 .46 .57* .56* 
PC German        .48* .02 .66** .53* .37 
PC G 
Recall 
        -.12 .17 .61** .14 
DT German          .10 .18 .22 
Forward 
DS 
          .56* .54* 
Backward 
OS 
           .44 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
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Table 18 Partial correlations for bilingual children, controlling for age and vma 
 Alternative naming 
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
Pragmatic cue, 
German 
False belief  .52* .66** .34 
Alternative naming  .41 .22 
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
  .22 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01 
 
Table 19 Correlation of tasks for children exposed to another language (n = 12) 
 VMA FB AN PC O 
PC O 
R 
DT O PC G 
PC G 
R 
DT G FDS BOS BD 
Age .37 .18 .23 .27 .66* .07 -.06 .05 .49 .71** .13 .71* 
VMA  -.18 .25 -.14 .11 .13 -.60* -.16 -.20 .43 .09 .63* 
False Belief    .62* .94*** .34 -.14 .58* -.14 -.31 .19 -.47 .17 
AN    .55 .06 .56 .01 -.27 -.27 .10 .01 .33 
PC Original     .42 -.27 .61* -.05 -.31 .37 -.52 .26 
PC O Recall      -.29 .37 .45 .04 .42 -.15 .23 
DT Original       -.45 -.28 .22 -.30 .44 .11 
PC German        .56 -.20 .07 -.26 -.39 
PC G Recall         -.01 .03 .21 -.49 
DT German          .14 .27 .16 
Forward DS           -.21 .77** 
Backward 
OS 
           -.19 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 
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Table 20 Partial correlations for exposed children, controlling for age and vma 
 Alternative naming 
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
Pragmatic cue, 
German 
False belief  .69* .94*** .58 
Alternative naming  .60 .19 
Pragmatic cue, 
original 
  .64* 
* p < .05,   *** p < .001 
 
Overall, the individual groups show slight differences in their task 
correlation (Tables 17 - 20). Children exposed to another language show 
strongest correlations between false belief and the pragmatic cue tasks. The 
correlation between alternative naming and PC falls below significance when 
age influences are taken into account. Bilingual children show additional 
correlations between age and the disambiguation task, which have not been 
observed with the other groups. 
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Discussion 4 
Bilingual children have been proposed to show different metalinguistic 
awareness. Especially in relation to mutual exclusivity, bilinguals were found to 
display less of a bias from around the age of five (Davidson et al., 1997; 
Davidson & Tell, 2005). Bilinguals were also suggested to have better inhibitory 
abilities around the age of five (Bialystok & Martin, 2004) and outperform 
monolinguals on IQ subtests (Lauchlan, Parisi, & Fadda, 2012). It was therefore 
of special interest whether bilingual children performed differently on the 
pragmatic cue task. If their ability to use pragmatic information was better and 
unrelated to the understanding of false belief, the perspectival accounts 
predictions would be incorrect.  
Overall, the groups presented strong and similar results to previous 
experiments. The pragmatic cue task, which was presented implicitly as English 
and additionally explicitly in a foreign language correlated well with the other 
metarepresentational tasks. No language effects were found comparing the 
three different groups on metalinguistic awareness. Children between the age 
of three and five were therefore similar in their ability to pass false belief, 
alternative naming and pragmatic cue. Previous research which pointed 
towards differences for the false belief task and children from multilingual 
backgrounds could not be confirmed (Farhadian et al., 2010; Goetz, 2003). 
Kovács (2009) presented bilingual children nearly 10 months younger than 
children in this study to outperform monolinguals on false belief performance. 
The bilinguals in her study passed false belief around the age of three to nearly 
60%, compared to 25% of the monolingual matched controls. Children in 
Kovác’s study were exposed to a much richer bilingual field, though. The 
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children visited bilingual nurseries and had a parent speaking each of the two 
languages at home. Having two parents speaking a different language might 
have a bigger impact on early theory of mind development, than growing up 
with one language at home and speaking another language at nursery and 
school. The bilinguals in Experiment 4 were mostly from one-language parents 
and spoke English as second language. This might have contributed to their 
similar behaviour on metarepresentational tasks. 
Bilinguals in Experiment 4 displayed significantly less disambiguation. 
Previous studies presented bilinguals mostly displaying less disambiguation 
effect slightly later (~the age of 5, for example Davidson et al., 1997). This 
seemed not to relate to their ability to use pragmatic information for object 
choice in the presented study, though. The different performance of bilinguals 
was further only observed in the original task, not in the German 
disambiguation task. No order effects of task presentation were observed. 
Bilinguals’ tendency to select familiar objects more often in the implicit English 
than the explicit German disambiguation task is therefore slightly puzzling. 
Looking at task correlations on the individual group levels, all 
relationships were observed for the original three tasks. The new, explicit 
German pragmatic cue task was slightly less stable. Children exposed to 
another language also presented no significant correlations between pragmatic 
cue and alternative naming. The number of children in this group was quite 
small and their performance was very unstable in general. Their performance 
gives an indication, though, that even small foreign language influences as 
weekly classes might contribute to different behaviour in metarepresentational 
tasks.  
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None of the working memory or inhibition tasks presented differences for 
the three groups, contrary to previous research which had shown bilingual 
children to perform better on inhibition tasks, relating this to better conceptual 
and attentional control (Bialystok & Martin, 2004). 
An interesting finding occurred around foreign language recall. Recall 
after the original pragmatic cue task was very low and did not differ between 
groups. But given the task instruction of facing a foreign language, bilingual 
children were able to outperform their monolingual peers. Children exposed to 
another language performed nearly as well as bilinguals and significantly better 
than in the original task. One possibility was the use of “real” German words. 
Children might be able to relate German words to their own second language, 
recognizing familiarities across other indo-european languages. This possibility 
could not be addressed in the presented studies and might be worthwhile to 
follow up on. 
The differences in recall asked for replication of the study and the 
inclusion of a recall task after the disambiguation task. This would show 
whether recall was dependent on task instruction, the combination of task 
instruction and pragmatic cue or a simple one time finding. 
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Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants. 
A total of 50 children (21 girls, mean age = 47 months, range 36 – 69, 
SD = 8) participated in this study from nurseries and child minders in Scotland 
and England. The study took place between 4 and 7 months after the previous 
and involved 19 children (6 monolingual, 6 bilingual, 7 exposed) of the earlier 
sample. Preliminary analyses indicated no differences between participants 
who were and were not included in Experiment 4. As all materials were also 
different to the previous study, their data was fully included.  
Children were divided into three groups depending on their language 
abilities, which parents confirmed through consent forms: Monolingual children 
(n = 18, 9 girls; mean age = 44 m, range = 37 – 59, SD = 6) spoke English as 
their mother tongue and had no history of foreign language learning. Bilingual 
children (n = 15, 5 girls; mean age = 50 m, range = 36 – 69, SD = 10) spoke 
English at age appropriate level and another language at home (see Appendix 
J for list of languages). Exposed children were monolingual English speakers 
and attended regular language classes (Spanish/French) at nursery once a 
week for 30 minutes for a minimum of 3 months (n = 17, 7 girls; mean age = 
47m, range = 38 – 56, SD = 6). The groups did not differ significantly on age (F 
(2,47) = 1.146, p = .327) or receptive English vocabulary as measured by the 
BPVS (F (2,46) = 3.044,  p = .057). 
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Design. 
Children participated in the following tasks over the course of two 
settings in random order: a false belief task, two disambiguation and pragmatic 
cue tasks, one set implicit in English and one set explicitly using words in a 
foreign language. Children further performed four subtests of the Wechsler 
Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1967), including two 
verbal tests (arithmetic & sentences) and two performance tests (maze & block 
design). The BPVS III (Dunn et al., 2009) was administered last. 
 
Procedure and Materials. 
False Belief task. 
The false belief task was as for Experiment 1, 2 and 4. 
 
Disambiguation task and pragmatic cue task, original and German. 
The disambiguation and pragmatic cue tasks were as in Experiment 4. 
New novel and German words were used as well as new pictures (Appendix K 
– N). The disambiguation tasks were additionally followed by a recall task, in 
the same way as the pragmatic cue tasks. 
 
WPPSI, verbal and performance tests. 
Materials and procedure for the WPPSI were applied as outlined in the 
WPPSI manual. 
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Arithmetic subtest. 
Materials consisted of a booklet with four cards, displaying a set of 
objects, nine flat square wooden blocks, painted red and a list of arithmetic 
questions. Children were presented with the booklet first and asked to point to 
one of the objects displayed (e.g. “Here are some balls. Which is the biggest? 
Point to it.”). After all cards were displayed, two wooden blocks were placed in 
front of the child and the child was asked: “How many blocks are there?”. This 
was repeated with four and nine blocks. Leaving the nine blocks on display, the 
child was told: “Now give me all of the blocks except four. Leave four of the 
blocks here.” . The last part of the task comprised a set of arithmetic questions 
which were read out to the child slowly (e.g., “If I cut an apple in half, how many 
pieces will I have?”).  The task was discontinued after four consecutive failures. 
A full list of all questions can be found in Appendix O. Children received one 
point for each correct response, the maximum score was 20. 
 
Sentences subtest. 
A list of sentences was read out to the child one at a time and the child 
was required to repeat the sentence precisely. The child was told: “I’m going to 
say something, and I want you to say it after me, just the way I say it. Ready? 
Listen.”. Following the WPPSI, each sentence was only read out once, if 
children asked for it again, they were told to guess. The task was continued 
until children failed on three consecutive sentences. Errors on each response 
were counted as follows: each word omitted was counted as one error, the 
transposition of a word or a phrase was counted as one error, the addition of 
one or more words was counted as one error, the substitution of words were 
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counted at the rate of one error for each word omitted. A full list of sentences 
and score table can be found in Appendix P. 
 
Maze subtest. 
Materials included ten sheets of paper, displaying a maze each. Mazes 
1-3 presented a chick on one side of the maze, mother hen on the other. Maze 
4 and 5 displayed a stickman in the center of the maze. In mazes 6-10 the 
stickman was replaced by a cross. The experimenter used a black pen, the 
child was given a red one. Instructions followed the WPPSI: “See this little 
chick? It wants to get to its mother on the other side (point), and it must get 
there by keeping inside the road and not going into the blocked road like this. 
(Point to the first blind alley.) Watch me. The chick starts here and then goes 
this way.” The experimenter drew a line from the chick, following the maze, then 
stopped in front of the first blind alley. “No, you wouldn’t go in here; it’s wrong.” 
(Wechsler, 1967, p.64). The experimenter continued and asked the child to 
finish the second half of the maze by herself. The second maze was identical to 
the first and the child was encouraged to complete this one from the start. Maze 
2 and 3 followed, the child received feedback when mistakes as drawing over 
the line or ending in a blind alley occurred and a new version of the maze was 
used to try again once more. Maze 3 was only presented if the child mastered 
maze 2 without errors on first or second trial, maze 4 only if maze 3 was 
mastered the second time without mistakes. The experimenter then 
demonstrated how to show the stickman the way out of the maze for the next 
picture, the child was encouraged to do the same with maze 4 and 5, and to 
start at the cross for maze 6 and following. Mazes 4 to 6 allowed 1 error to 
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precede to the next, maze 7 and 8 allowed two errors and maze 9 and 10 three 
errors.  An example of mazes can be found in Appendix Q as well as a score 
table. 
 
Block design subtest. 
A set of six flat wooden blocks, one side painted red, the other side white 
and 8 blocks red on one side, half red – half white on the other side was set 
aside for this task. A booklet with three printed cards was used for the last part 
of the task. The experimenter used a score sheet, containing designs of models 
for two to four blocks. The first set of three blocks was set up behind a screen 
and then presented to the child. The experimenter then demonstrated with a 
second set of three blocks how to replicate the design. The child was then 
given three blocks and asked to do the same, receiving feedback and also 
being allowed to try again. Design 2 was presented next. The task was 
discontinued if the child failed to replicate the design 1 and 2 on both trials. 
Otherwise, design 3 and 4 were administered. The task was stopped if the child 
failed on both trails of 2 consecutive designs after design 3. Designs 8 to 10 
were presented as pictures on cards. The child was asked to arrange the 
blocks to make them look like the picture. Each design scored 2 points if 
replicated on first trial, one point if mastered on second trial and zero points if 
failed. A full set of all designs can be found in Appendix R.  
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Results 5 
Task performance 
Children’s performance was compared between the three language 
backgrounds. The false belief task, both pragmatic cue and both 
disambiguation tasks had set pass/fail criteria. Mean performance was 
compared for the subtests of the WPPSI. No significant differences were found 
between monolingual and bilingual children and children exposed to another 
language (Table 21).  
 
Table 21 Task performance by language background in percentage/means 
 Monolingual Bilingual Exposed Comparison 
FB pass  50 33 65 Χ
2
 (2) = 3.137, p = .208, d = .250 
PC O pass (≥4) 67 53 71 Χ
2
 (2) = 1.117, p = .572, d = .149 
PC G pass (≥4)  61 53 77 Χ
2
 (2) = 1.953, p = .377, d = .198 
DT O pass (≥4)  67 53 77 Χ
2
 (2) = 1.907, p = .385, d = .195 
DT G pass (≥4)  67 60 41 Χ
2
 (2) = 2.445, p = .295, d = .221 
WPPSI 
Arithmetic 
Mean = 5.78,  
SD = 2.80 
Mean = 6.33,  
SD = 4.05 
Mean = 6.71,  
SD = 2.31 
F (2,47) = .401, p = .672 
Sentences 
Mean = 7.94,  
SD = 3.95 
Mean = 8.40,  
SD = 6.07 
Mean = 8.35,  
SD = 3.61 
F (2,47) = .051, p = .950 
Maze 
Mean = 2.50,  
SD = 2.66 
Mean = 3.67,  
SD = 3.90 
Mean = 4.35,  
SD = 3.66 
F (2,47) = 1.320, p = .277 
Block design 
Mean = 4.50,  
SD = 4.53 
Mean = 5.60,  
SD = 5.24 
Mean = 4.41,  
SD = 2.55 
F (2,47) = .387, p = .681 
WPPSI combi, 
proportion 
correct 
Mean = 21.09%, 
SD = 12.42 
Mean = 24.62%, 
SD = 17.08 
Mean = 24.22%, 
SD = 8.49 
F (2,47) = .366, p = .695 
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Comparing individual tasks. 
Pragmatic cue and disambiguation task. 
A 3*2*2 mixed ANOVA with between participants factor “language 
background” (monolingual, bilingual, exposed) and within participants factor 
“cue” (pragmatic/no cue) and “test language” (English/German version) was 
performed on task performance. The main effect of “cue” was significant: F 
(1,47) = 60.98, p < .001, partial ŋ2 = .565. The familiar object was more likely to 
be selected as referent for the novel word in both pragmatic cue tasks (PC O: 
mean = 3.62, SD = 1.52; PC G: mean = 3.50, SD = 1.43) than in the 
disambiguation tasks (DT O: mean = 1.14, SD = 1.34; DT G: mean = 1.82, SD 
= 1.80).  
There was a significant interaction between cue and test language (F 
(1,47) = 7.23, p = .010, partial ŋ2 = .133), with children showing less 
disambiguation effect in the German task than in the original version, but no 
clear difference for the pragmatic cue tasks. The main effect of test language 
was not significant: F (1,47) = 3.51, p = .067, partial ŋ2 = .069. 
The interaction between test language and language background was 
not significant, neither was the three-way interaction or the main effect of 
language background (all F < 2.49, all p > . 094). 
Experiment 4 had demonstrated less disambiguation effect in bilinguals 
compared to monolinguals (t = 3.215, df = 32, p = .003, d = 1.137; BL: mean 
3.83/5, SD = 1.04; ML = 4.75/5, SD = .58). These findings could not be 
replicated (t = .587, df = 31, p = .561, d = .21; BL: mean 3.53/5, SD = 1.25; ML 
= 3.83/5, SD = 1.62). 
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All tasks were followed by a recall task (Table 22). Analysis discovered a 
significant three-way-interaction between “cue”, “test language” and “language 
background” for recall: F (2,47) = 4.69, p = .014, partial ŋ2 = .166. A follow up 
revealed that bilingual children recalled significantly more German words after 
the pragmatic cue task than both other groups: F (2,47) = 4.09, p = .023; post-
hoc Bonferroni: bilingual/monolingual, p = .055; bilingual/exposed, p = .040. 
Table 22 Recall after PC and DT tasks (mean ± SD, max. 5) 
 PC original PC German DT original DT German 
Monolingual 1.28 ± 1.27 .78 ± .81 1.06 ± 1.11 1.28 ± 1.32 
Bilingual 1.33 ± 1.35 2.00 ± 1.85 1.73 ± 1.58 1.27 ± 1.03 
Exposed 1.24 ± 1.30 .71 ± .92 1.41 ± 1.28 1.18 ± 1.07 
 
 
False belief. 
To pass the false belief task all 3 questions had to be answered correctly 
(belief, reality, memory). 50% (25) of the children passed this task. 2 children 
failed the reality question and 3 the memory question as well as the belief 
question. 
 
WPPSI. 
Children were scored in accordance to the WPPSI manual (Wechsler, 
1967). No significant differences on mean performance scores were observed 
between the three language groups (Table 21). 
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Correlation of tasks. 
A correlational analysis was performed between all tasks, age and the 
standardized scores of the BPVS III (Table 23). The subtests of the WPPSI 
correlated strongly, as well as to age and verbal-mental age. Following the 
correlation between the pragmatic cue tasks and false belief, a partial 
correlation was performed, partialling out age, verbal-mental age and WPPSI 
combi (Table 24), presenting stable and highly significant correlations. 
Correlations for the individual language groups were not as strong 
(Tables 25 – 30). 
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Table 23 Correlation between tasks 
 VMA FB PC O PC O R DT O DT O R PC G PC G R DT G DT G R Arithmetic Sentences Maze 
Block 
Design 
WPPSI 
combi 
Age .42** .31* .36** .17 .19 .37** .29* .25 -.04 .21 .68*** .70*** .62*** .55*** .75*** 
VMA  .28* .36* .21 .21 .35* .34* .06 .01 -.06 .55*** .53*** .37** .32* .51*** 
False 
Belief 
  .65*** -.03 .26 .05 .55*** .12 -.19 .25 .33* .34* .42** .31* .41** 
PC Original    -.08 .18 .08 .68*** .02 -.14 .23 .37** .39** .32* .25 .39** 
PC O 
Recall 
    .19 .27 -.03 .20 .08 .14 .33* .26 .07 .09 .21 
DT Original      .09 .10 .09 .42** .24 .30* .40** .21 .25 -.34* 
DT O 
Recall 
      .20 -.17 .13 .26 .45** .29* .19 .15 .31* 
PC German        .04 -.24 .19 .31* .23 .34* .19 .31* 
PC G 
Recall 
        .10 .09 .19 .34* .17 .26 .29* 
DT German          .07 .16 .13 -.22 -.03 -.01 
DT G 
Recall 
          .15 .18 .03 .10 .14 
Arithmetic            .72*** .57*** .60*** .86*** 
Sentences             .54*** .59*** .84*** 
Maze              .54*** .77*** 
Block 
Design 
              .86*** 
*p < .05,   ** p < .01,   ***p < .001  
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Table 24 Partial correlations, controlling for age, verbal-mental age and IQ 
 Pragmatic cue, original Pragmatic cue, German 
False belief  .58*** .48** 
Pragmatic cue, original  .62*** 
** p < .01,   ***p < .001  
 
Table 25 Partial correlations, monolingual group 
 Pragmatic cue, original Pragmatic cue, German 
False belief  .69** .75** 
Pragmatic cue, original  .71** 
** p < .01 
 
Table 26 Partial correlations, bilingual group 
 Pragmatic cue, original Pragmatic cue, German 
False belief  .17 .40 
Pragmatic cue, original  .66* 
*p < .05 
 
Table 27 Partial correlations, exposed group 
 Pragmatic cue, original Pragmatic cue, German 
False belief  .82** .32 
Pragmatic cue, original  .46 
** p < .01 
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Table 28 Correlation between tasks for monolingual group  
 VMA FB PC O PC O R DT O DT O R PC G PC G R DT G DT G R Arithmetic Sentences Maze 
Block 
Design 
WPPSI 
combi 
Age .64** .44 .29 .25 -.02 .68** .18 .10 .11 .18 .63** .57* .73** .56* .72* 
VMA  .28 .31 .39 .03 .53* .18 .22 .09 -.13 .52* .52* .51* .32 .52* 
False 
Belief 
  .71** .22 .04 .36 .73** .28 .42 .48* .16 .33 .58* .24 .35 
PC Original    .11 .00 .26 .72** .11 .25 .40 .33 .37 .40 .05 .28 
PC O 
Recall 
    -.14 .61** .02 .18 -.07 .37 .41 .52* -.01 .27 .36 
DT Original      -.01 .29 -.38 .69** -.44 -.03 -.45 .39 -.18 -.12 
DT O 
Recall 
      .15 .15 .18 .19 .55* .61** .39 .45 .58* 
PC German        -.04 .45 .18 .10 .05 .49* .11 .19 
PC G 
Recall 
        -.03 .45 .37 .57* .11 .45 .46 
DT German          -.13 .02 -.19 .48* -.05 .04 
DT G 
Recall 
          .35 .49* .13 .41 .43 
Arithmetic            .73** .57* .75*** .91*** 
Sentences             .29 .59* .77*** 
Maze              .58* .70** 
Block 
Design 
              .92*** 
*p < .05,   ** p < .01,   ***p < .001  
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Table 29 Correlation between tasks for bilingual group  
 VMA FB PC O PC O R DT O DT O R PC G PC G R DT G DT G R Arithmetic Sentences Maze 
Block 
Design 
WPPSI 
combi 
Age .43 .46 .59* .04 -.42 .30 .51 .24 -.16 .26 .78** .86*** .75** .67** .84*** 
VMA  .32 .22 .36 -.37 .44 .41 .19 -.46 .03 .66* .62* .50 .52 .64 
False 
Belief 
  .39 -.18 -.39 -.06 .53* .36 .22 .24 .41 .56* .48 .39 .50 
PC Original    -.28 -.26 .04 .75** .08 -.06 .24 .44 .51 .36 .30 .44 
PC O 
Recall 
    -.40 .45 -.08 .05 -.28 -.07 .28 -.07 .17 -.10 .06 
DT Original      -.37 -.28 -.15 .40 -.22 -.53* -.43 -.63* -.45 -.56* 
DT O 
Recall 
      .39 -.34 -.57* .27 .61* .24 .25 .08 .32 
PC German        .07 -.08 .34 .54* .50 .35 .21 .43 
PC G 
Recall 
        .01 -.09 .08 .34 .43 .21 .28 
DT German          -.30 -.36 -.26 -.17 -.02 -.21 
DT G 
Recall 
          -.01 .03 -.05 -.07 -.03 
Arithmetic            .85*** .80*** .62* .89*** 
Sentences             .85*** .73** .94*** 
Maze              .69** .90*** 
Block 
Design 
              .87*** 
*p < .05,   ** p < .01,   ***p < .001  
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Table 30 Correlation between tasks for exposed group  
 VMA FB PC O PC O R DT O DT O R PC G PC G R DT G DT G R Arithmetic Sentences Maze 
Block 
Design 
WPPSI 
combi 
Age .29 .10 .16 .30 -.19 .11 .21 .22 .23 .34 .50* .49* .32 .18 .53* 
VMA  .09 .41 -.07 -.23 .15 .50* .13 .12 -.02 .45 .55* .06 .30 .46 
False 
Belief 
  .83*** -.16 -.48 -.05 .37 .03 -.19 .01 .45 .11 .28 .57* .52* 
PC Original    -.10 -.38 -.01 .59* .02 .13 -.03 .35 .24 .27 .77*** .59* 
PC O 
Recall 
    -.10 -.21 -.06 .58* .08 .01 .34 .48 .05 .12 .33 
DT Original      .06 -.64** .01 .12 .08 -.45 -.35 -.46 -.27 -.56* 
DT O 
Recall 
      .07 -.42 .01 .40 .04 .06 -.07 -.27 -.10 
PC German        .12 .15 .12 .33 .18 .19 .41 .40 
PC G 
Recall 
        -.34 .06 .43 .20 -.25 -.03 .10 
DT German          .24 -.23 .11 .31 .33 .21 
DT G 
Recall 
          .12 -.02 .05 -.30 -.06 
Arithmetic            .41 .20 .31 .67** 
Sentences             .30 .21 .66** 
Maze              .40 .73** 
Block 
Design 
              .71** 
*p < .05,   ** p < .01,   ***p < .00
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Discussion 5 
Questions addressed with this study were whether differences in ability 
to recall novel words explicitly presented in a foreign language could be found 
again in children from different language backgrounds. Children additionally 
matched on their performance on the WPPIS and can so reasonably be 
compared on other measures.. General findings of children being more likely to 
select the familiar object in the pragmatic cue tasks than the disambiguation 
tasks were repeated without any differences between the three language 
backgrounds. 
The bilingual children in Experiment 5 also disambiguated to the same 
level as monolingual children. This was due to monolingual children in this 
study displaying less disambiguation than in study 4. No effects of order 
(PC/DT) or age differences between the two studies could be observed. 
Bilingual disambiguation behaviour observed in the last two studies fits previous 
research therefore as disambiguation was detected from around the age of 3 
(Davidson et al., 1997; Frank & Poulin-Dubois, 2002).  
The groups performed overall similarly on the pragmatic and 
disambiguation tasks. The new German pragmatic cue items seemed more 
stable than the previous and correlated well with false belief and the original 
task, staying strong after the influence of age and verbal-mental age were 
accounted for. Looking at the correlations for the individual groups, monolingual 
children show all correlations between PC tasks and false belief after age and 
verbal-mental age is accounted for. Bilingual children displayed weaker 
correlation between the pragmatic cue tasks and false belief, slightly less 
children passed false belief in this group. Exposed children showed again 
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correlations between false belief and the original pragmatic cue task. The 
German PC task is therefore a further metarepresentational task, comparable 
to the implicit English task especially for children with no foreign language 
background. Foreign language teaching might interact with the reaction to an 
explicit foreign language task. Group sizes were quite small, though. 
Recall was overall better than in Experiment 4 for the original PC task. 
Recall also did not differ between groups for PC original and both 
disambiguation tasks. The German word recall presented differences again. 
Bilingual children recalled more German words than their monolingual peers 
and now also more than children exposed to another language. It needs to be 
pointed out, though, that the two groups recalling fewer German words had 
lower means in this task than in the other three recalls. A novel word explicitly 
from a foreign language might seem too much effort or not attract enough 
attention for monolinguals to memorize. Bilinguals recalled more German words 
than implicit English in the PC and DT task and German words in the DT task. 
The cue in the German task might therefore to be of use for Bilinguals to initiate 
memorizing novel words. 
Why the two other groups found it harder to memorize German words in 
the PC task can only be speculated about. Differences in language recall have 
been studied in adult monolingual and bilingual samples (Kaushanskaya & 
Marian, 2009; Kaushanskaya & Rechtzigel, 2012). The authors found bilingual 
adults to perform better in novel word recall. It was suggested that this was due 
to more tolerant and efficient phonological encoding in bilinguals combined with 
better inhibition. Especially concrete terms were better and faster recalled by 
bilinguals. This was also connected to higher activation due to the dual 
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language activation. Bilingual children might display superior recall out of the 
same reasons. They might additionally need the task instruction to be faced 
with a foreign language, as they did not display better recall in the implicit 
English PC task. The pragmatic cue also added certainty that the familiar object 
was the correct choice, there is no certainty in the disambiguation task, just a 
sensible choice to make. Hence, no better recall in the German disambiguation 
task. The adults in the study mentioned above found it harder to memorize 
abstract words, which might also be similar to children memorizing names for 
unfamiliar and more abstract objects.  
The third group, children exposed to other languages by language 
classes, behaved slightly differently in this experiment than in the previous 
study. Their performance was more similarly to bilinguals on recall in 
Experiment 4. In this study, they behaved more similarly to monolingual 
children. The amount of time spend learning another language might have 
influenced this, although all children had been exposed to language classes for 
at least three months and not more than 15 months. This did not differ to the 
previous study. Individual differences might account for mean differences on 
recall. More exact measures of the amount of classes attended might give 
further insight here. 
Overall, Experiment 4 and 5 did not reveal major differences between 
the language backgrounds. Previous research findings like enhance inhibitory 
control or other memory advantages in bilinguals could not be repeated. This 
might be due to the mixed amount of bilingualism presented in the sample, 
where most children spoke English as their second language and their mother 
tongue at home with both parents.  
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Children attending regular language teaching displayed a spread of 
performance which was more similar to bilinguals on some tasks and more 
similar to monolinguals at other times on the same tasks. This asks for 
thorough screening of language exposure for studies like this. Many parents 
would not consider their children to be experiencing foreign language influences 
due to the small amount of teaching in nursery. But differences were observed. 
The major finding around novel label recall points to a superior ability of 
bilinguals to learn new words if they are explicitly presented as a foreign 
language. This ability has been observed in adults before. This is the first study 
to show similarities in children between the age of three and five. 
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General discussion 
The metacognitive and metalinguistic development of monolingual and 
bilingual children was investigated. Findings in order of experiments were as 
follows: 
1) Children can suspend the disambiguation effect when given pragmatic 
information that this is sensible at the same time as they pass other 
metacognitive and metalinguistic tasks. The new pragmatic cue task 
correlates well with false belief and alternative naming. 
2) Children’s ability to use the pragmatic cue is not influenced by impulsive 
reactions to hearing the cue first. Executive functioning abilities like 
inhibition did not relate to children’s object choice. 
3)  
a) The Pragmatic cue task was further refined by providing the cue before 
showing the pictures. Recall tasks demonstrated actual word learning in 
the pragmatic cue and disambiguation task. The pragmatic cue paradigm 
was extended to the correction effect. Children tended to correct one of 
two novel labels supplied by the experimenter even when faced with 
strong pragmatic information to allow overlap. The correction effect 
correlated with other metacognitive tasks but persisted even with older 
children. 
b) The misnaming task was included. Previous findings by Waxman and 
Hatch (1992)showed preschool children producing multiple labels in one 
discourse. These findings were not replicated. Children were not able to 
produce labels on different categorical levels, even after the task was 
simplified. 
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4) Bilinguals: 
a) The pragmatic cue findings were replicated with bilingual children and 
children exposed to another language. Both new groups performed 
similarly to their monolingual peers. Bilinguals showed a slight 
advantage in recalling novel foreign language labels. 
b) Bilinguals and children exposed to another language performed similarly 
to monolinguals on additional tasks concerning inhibition and general 
intelligence. There was some support for bilingual’s advantage in foreign 
language learning. 
 
The perspectival account can account for all data presented. The 
account predicts a connection between metalinguistic abilities and theory of 
mind development. Perner (2000) explained the understanding of perspective 
to be observed in the understanding of beliefs. The same perspectival 
understanding is necessary to pass false belief and alternative naming (Perner 
et al., 2002). The pragmatic cue task extends this into the area of word learning 
showing strong correlations to the former two tasks. The connection proved 
repeatable and stable, taking the influence of age, verbal mental age and 
executive functioning into account. 
Concerns regarding young children’s possible impulsive reaction towards 
cues were thoroughly addressed. Variations of the PC task, presenting the cue 
before or after the novel word (Experiment 2), turning the pictures over after the 
novel words were introduced and asking whether the child knew the novel word 
(Experiment 3) did not produce any differences in children’s performance. The 
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ability to inhibit a response was not a determining outcome in the pragmatic cue 
task. 
Although disambiguation tasks are used to investigate word learning, 
none of the studies cited tested retention of novel words in preschool children 
(e.g.Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Haryu, 1991; Markman & Wachtel, 1988). 
Recall was therefore examined in Experiment 3a and b. Children identified 
more than half of all novel words in both disambiguation tasks, the original and 
the cued version. Brief exposure is therefore sufficient for children at this age to 
identify referents of novel words again. Hence, disambiguation and pragmatic 
cue task were shown to assess word learning. 
The misnaming task addressed previous findings that children can 
produce multiple labels (Waxman & Hatch, 1992). In Experiment 3a, children 
mostly persevered with their initial response and did not take the experimenter’s 
misnaming as a cue to alter their response and produce a different categorical 
label. No relationship between the misnaming task and the alternative naming 
task was detected. The task does not appear to reliably produce alternative 
naming in this age range, even after simplifying the task in Experiment 3b. 
The perspectival account predicts that children display a different word 
learning behaviour in regard to their understanding of perspective (Doherty & 
Perner, 2013; Perner et al., 2002). Investigating bilingual’s word learning was 
therefore essential, as they were often found to show less disambiguation effect 
(Davidson et al., 1997; Davidson & Tell, 2005; Houston-Price et al., 2010). 
Bilingual children and children exposed to another language were shown to 
pass false belief, alternative naming and pragmatic cue at the same time. Their 
ability to use pragmatic information to change disambiguation behaviour was 
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similar to monolinguals. The perspectival accounts predictions were therefore 
further supported. 
Further, this was the first presentation of the alternative naming task 
(after Perner et al., 2002) in bilingual children. Bilingual children displayed the 
same difficulties producing alternative labels for familiar object as their 
monolingual peers until they passed false belief. Hence, within one language, 
bilingual children show the same metalinguistic awareness and metacognitive 
abilities as monolingual children. 
No significant performance differences were detected for the different 
language groups apart from slightly better foreign language learning in the 
bilingual group. Research into adult language learning pointed to bilingual’s 
superior encoding, storage and retrieval of novel words (Kaushanskaya & 
Marian, 2009; Kaushanskaya & Rechtzigel, 2012). Children in the conducted 
studies show early indications of this later advantage. 
 
Theoretical considerations. 
The lexical principles approach claims the mutual exclusivity bias to be a 
useful word learning heuristic (Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Merriman & 
Bowman, 1989). In Experiment 1 to 5, children tended to behave as if nouns 
were mutually exclusive in all the disambiguation tasks, but they displayed 
different behaviour in the pragmatic cue tasks. Here, their referent selection 
was associated with their ability to correctly identify false belief based 
judgements. A possible explanation along the lines of the lexical principles 
account could be that with development children become able to take more 
additional information into account. This allows them to decide, in the case of 
122 
 
the PC task, that the information is sufficient to abandon the mutual exclusivity 
bias for the familiar object, like on a case-by-case scenario (Markman, 1989). 
But the lexical principles account does not predict when children can take this 
information into account. Especially, no association with metacognitive or 
metalinguistic development is predicted. The clear developmental change in 
children’s behaviour demonstrated by the pragmatic cue task can therefore not 
be explained by the lexical principles approach, as well as the correlation of 
false belief understanding and ability to use the cue for referent selection.  
The explanations of the sociopragmatic account (Bloom, 2000; 
Diesendruck & Markson, 2001) also cannot account for the data presented. 
Children’s behaviour in the pragmatic cue task cannot be explained by their 
ability to interpret speaker intention If children could determine word meaning 
by “reading the speaker’s mind” as suggested by supporters of the socio-
pragmatic account, they would easily select the familiar object as referent. The 
cue given is obvious. Children reacting only on the cue should always select the 
familiar object as it is the only logical choice (e.g. Susanne Grassmann & 
Tomasello, 2010). But only children passing false belief consistently do. The 
sociopragmatic account cannot explain why children disregard very clear 
pragmatic information and, similarly to the lexical principles account, cannot 
explain the developmental change in referent selection in relation to passing 
false belief. 
The perspectival account predicts a connection between metalinguistic 
abilities and theory of mind development (Perner et al., 2002). The pragmatic 
cue task tested throughout the studies shows a strong and stable relationship to 
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alternative naming and false belief. The perspectival account’s predictions can 
therefore confidently be extended into the area of word learning. 
 
Limitations. 
An issue of the novel pragmatic cue task was that younger children 
seemed to disambiguate less in the pragmatic cue task than in standard 
disambiguation tasks. They seemed to start using pragmatic information, but 
unreliably. An attempt to look closer at this development was made in 
Experiment 3 (which took place after Experiment 4 and 5). But the lack of 
sufficient young participants did not result in enough data to analyse the 
problem thoroughly. It seems as if the transition from false-belief-fail to false-
belief-pass is paralleled in the pragmatic cue task with a more gradual 
consideration of pragmatic information. This needs to be addressed in future 
studies. 
Experiment 4 and 5 considered bilingual children from a variety of 
language backgrounds. All children were able to express themselves in two 
languages, but it might be important to consider more thorough screening in the 
future. First, children with two parents speaking two different languages and 
children with one foreign language spoken at home should be considered 
separately. It is unknown whether children who speak one language at home 
and another in nursery/school and children who grow up with two languages at 
home show the same linguistic developmental pattern.  
Also, children taking part in the presented studies came from many 
different language combinations. A more concise study design would focus on a 
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bilingual combination of English and one other language. This was not possible 
in the timeframe give for this thesis, but has to be considered for future work. 
 
Conclusion. 
The disambiguation effect in young children was demonstrated to be the 
result of a cognitive limitation. The relationship between theory of mind, 
alternative naming and the pragmatic cue task suggests that this limitation is a 
lack of understanding of perspective.  
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Appendix A 
Novel words, pragmatic cues and objects for pragmatic cue task, experiment 1 
Novel word Pragmatic cue Familiar object Novel object 
Hinkel hungry Banana Bottle stopper 
Flinder sleepy Bed Bracket 
Budit cold Jumper 
Drill slack 
adjuster 
Jintoff thirsty Juice 
Hose end 
connector 
Lozee bored Book 
Bicycle trouser 
clip 
(Disambiguation condition used same materials apart from cues) 
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Appendix B 
Novel words, pragmatic cues and pictures for pragmatic cue task, experiment 2 
& 4 
Novel word Pragmatic cue Familiar picture Novel picture 
Hinkel hungry 
  
Flinder sleepy 
  
Budit cold 
  
Jintoff thirsty 
  
Momtik sore 
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Appendix C 
Sets of novel words, familiar and novel items, correction task, experiment 3a 
Novel 
word 1 
Novel 
word 2 
Target novel 
item 
Unnamed 
novel item 
Familiar item 1 
Familiar item 
2 
Cue 
Puhne Mieber 
    
hungry 
Welne Nische 
    
thirsty 
Sahle Focher 
    
tired 
Grieber Tachte 
    
cold 
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Appendix D 
Stimuli and questions for misnaming task, experiment 3a 
Picture presented  Subordinate Basic Superordinate 
 
“Is this a …?” Owl Dog Human 
Expected 
category 
Parrot Bird Animal 
 
* 
“Is this a …?” High chair Table Vehicle 
Expected 
category 
Rocking chair Chair Furniture 
 
* 
“Is this a …?” Bee Bird Plant 
Expected 
category 
Ladybird Beetle Insect 
 
 
“Is this a …?” Ken Child Person 
Expected 
category 
Barbie Doll Toy 
 
 
“Is this a …?” Fir tree Flower Insect 
Expected 
category 
Palm Tree Plant 
 
* 
“Is this a …?” Sandal Boot Toy 
Expected 
category 
Trainer Shoe Clothes 
 
 
“Is this a …?” Boy Grown-up Animal 
Expected 
category 
Girl Child Human 
 
* 
“Is this a …?” Fire engine Aeroplane Furniture 
Expected 
category 
Police car Car Vehicle 
* Items are combined nouns in the subordinate category in German (e.g. police car : 
Polizeiauto) 
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Appendix E 
Stimuli and questions for misnaming task, experiment 3b 
Picture presented  Subordinate Basic Superordinate 
 
“Is this a …?” Dachshund Cat Human 
Expected 
category 
Dalmatian Dog Animal 
     
 
“Is this a …?” Apple Vegetable Drink 
Expected 
category 
Banana Fruit Food 
     
 
“Is this a …?” Tulip Tree Animal 
Expected 
category 
Rose Flower Plant 
     
 
“Is this a …?” Fireman Woman Plant 
Expected 
category 
Doctor Man Human 
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Appendix F 
Bilingual children’s additional language to English, experiment 4 (n = 18) 
Number of children Second language 
4 Spanish 
3 Arabic 
3 Polish 
2 French 
2 Hindi 
1 Chinese 
1 Finnish 
1 Chewa 
1 Italian 
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Appendix G 
Novel words and pictures for disambiguation task, experiment 4 
Novel word Familiar picture Novel picture 
Lozee 
  
Kuble 
  
Pimsulf 
  
Silder 
  
Delsy 
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Appendix H 
Novel words, pragmatic cues and pictures for German pragmatic cue task, 
experiment 4 
Novel word Pragmatic cue Familiar picture Novel picture 
Birne hungry 
  
Decke sleepy 
  
Muetze cold 
 
 
Saft thirsty 
  
Salbe sore 
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Appendix I 
Novel words and pictures for German disambiguation task, experiment 4 
Novel word Familiar picture Novel picture 
Spiegel 
 
 
Brille 
  
Pilz 
  
Ente 
  
Fahrrad 
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Appendix J 
Bilingual children’s additional language to English, experiment 5 (n = 15) 
Number of children Second language 
4 Polish 
3 Spanish 
3 Arabic 
2 French 
1 Hindi 
1 Swazi 
1 Russian 
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Appendix K 
Novel words, pragmatic cues and pictures for pragmatic cue task, experiment 5 
Novel word Pragmatic cue Familiar picture Novel picture 
Wukti hungry 
 
 
Bamshy sleepy 
  
Slintoff cold 
  
Gamtik thirsty 
 
 
Dolpho sore 
  
Experiment 3a used the same materials, novel words were replaced by more 
German sounding words: Nohle, Tahne, Doffe, Nehbe. 
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Appendix L 
Novel words and pictures for disambiguation task, experiment 5 
Novel word Familiar picture Novel picture 
Jicky 
  
Lunti 
  
Moltin 
  
Pitshu 
  
Ranglee 
  
Experiment 3a used the same materials, novel words were replaced by more 
German sounding words: Kulde, Fende, Albe, Mehfe, Losse. 
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Appendix M 
Novel words, pragmatic cues and pictures for German pragmatic cue task, 
experiment 5 
Novel word Pragmatic cue Familiar picture Novel picture 
Kuchen hungry 
  
Schlafsack sleepy 
  
Stiefel cold 
 
 
Kaba thirsty 
  
Verband sore 
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Appendix N 
Novel words and pictures for German disambiguation task, experiment 5 
Novel word Familiar picture Novel picture 
Tasche 
  
Muetze 
  
Stifte 
  
Loeffel 
  
Dreirad 
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Appendix O 
WPPSI-  Arithmetic subtest, list of problems 
For problems 1 through 4, cards in a booklet were used. 
1. Card 1 - Balls Here are some balls. Which is the biggest? Point to it. 
2. Card 2 - Sticks Here are some sticks. Which is the longest? Point to it. 
3. Card 3 - Stars Here are some boxes with stars in them. Which box has the most 
stars? Point to it. 
4. Card 4 - Cherries These bowls have some cherries in them. Which bowls have the same 
number of cherries? Point to them.  
For problems 5 through 8, red wooden blocks were used.  
5. Counting to 2 How many blocks are there? 
6. Counting to 4 How many are there? Count them with your finger. 
7. Counting to 9 Count these blocks with your finger. 
8. (cont. with 9 blocks) Now give me all of the blocks except four. Leave four of the blocks 
here. 
Problems 9 through 20 were read to the child 
9.  If I cut an apple in half, how many pieces will I have? 
10.  Harry had 2 pennies and his daddy gave him 1 more. How many did 
he have altogether? 
11.  Johnny had 3 marbles and lost 1. How many did he have left? 
12.  Mary had 5 dolls. She lost 2. How many did she have left? 
13.  John had 4 pennies and his mother gave him 2 more. How many did 
he have altogether? 
14.  How many are 2 books and 3 books? 
15.  Bob ate 1 piece of candy. Sue ate 2 pieces, and Jack ate 2 pieces. 
Altogether, how many pieces of candy did they eat? 
16.  If 1 apple costs 2 cents, how much will 2 apples cost? 
17.  Jane, Alice, and Ann each have 2 crayons. How many crayons do 
they have altogether? 
18.  If 1 orange costs 4 cents, how much will 2 oranges cost? 
19.  A boy had 12 newspapers and sold 5. How many did he have left? 
20.  James had 8 marbles and he bought 6 more. How many marbles did 
he have altogether? 
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Appendix P 
WPPSI-  Sentences subtest 
A. My house. 
B. Cows are big. 
C. We sleep at night. 
A, B, and C were only administered if sentence 1 was failed. 
1. Mary has a red coat. 
2. The bad dog ran after the cat. 
3. Tom found three blue eggs in his birdhouse. 
4. Susie has two dolls and a brown teddy bear. 
5. It is very nice to go to a camp in the summertime. 
6. Peter would like to have new boots and a cowboy suit. 
7. Eating too much candy and ice-cream can give you a stomachache. 
8. The heavy rain which fell last night made many buses late for school. 
9. The price of shoes and winter clothing is not as high as it was last year. 
10. Next Monday our class will visit the zoo. Bring your lunch and be sure to be on time. 
 
Score table 
Sentences 
Number of errors 
0 1 2 3 4+ 
A - B 1 0 0 0 0 
C 2 1 0 0 0 
1 – 4 2 1 0 0 0 
5 – 6 3 2 1 0 0 
7 - 10 4 3 2 1 0 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
Appendix Q 
WPPSI-  Maze subtest 
 Presentation to the child per sheet 
Maze 1 A + B 
 
Maze 2 A + B 
 
Maze 3 A+B 
 
Sample, Maze 4 - 6 
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Maze 7 + 8 
 
Maze 9 
 
Maze 10 
 
 
Score table 
Maze Errors allowed Performance Score 
1 A Not counted No errors 1 
1 B 0 No errors 1 
2 0 
2A no errors 
2 B no errors 
2 
1 
3 
1 on Maze 3 A 
0 on Maze 3 B 
3 A no errors 
3 A one error 
3 B no errors 
2 
1 
1 
149 
 
4, 5, 6 1 
No errors 
One error 
2 
1 
7, 8 2 
No errors 
One error 
Two errors 
3 
2 
1 
9, 10 3 
No errors 
One error 
Two errors 
Three errors 
4 
3 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150 
 
Appendix R 
WPPSI-  Block design subtest 
 
 
Card 8 
 
Card 9 
 
Card 10 
 
 
 
 
